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Project title: The Sino-American relations – towards a shifting in world order? 
 
 
Abstract: 
The debate about a shift in the power balance between China and the United States is raging. 
Numbers of scholars are arguing that China takes on the hegemonic status of the United States, 
whereas others refute this standpoint. On the basis of a review of existing literature, a hypothesis is 
set up, claiming that China is challenging US hegemony.  
In order to test the hypothesis, we examine (i) the common history between China and the United 
States since the Great Aberration in 1979; (ii) the dynamics in the East-Asia region, in particular the 
dispute over Taiwanese independence, due to its essential role in Sino-American relations; (iii) the 
economic and military relations between China and the United States regarding Taiwan.  
 
The behavior of China and the United States creates breeding ground for an analysis of their 
relations through John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, focusing on states’ strive for hegemony, 
and Keohane & Nye’s complex interdependence, suggesting an increasing cooperation and 
interdependence. Moreover, these two theoretical approaches are discussed in the conclusive part, 
assessing whether they can explain the actions and purposes of China and the United States since 
the employed departure point, in 1979. 
Our research cannot confirm the hypothesis that US hegemony is being challenged as the US still is, 
by many, seen as the world’s unique hegemon. Even though it is difficult to evaluate the exact 
Chinese military capabilities, one can be certain that they are far behind those of the United States. 
In return, military power doesn’t seem that relevant currently, as the two countries are heading 
towards an increasing interdependence on the economic level. It is also questionable whether China 
altogether seeks to achieve hegemonic status, even though John Mearsheimer would claim the 
opposite.  
On the other hand, China’s increasing economic power can be said to be a challenge to the US 
hegemony, as it has resulted in a more equal power distribution between the two countries. 
Furthermore, China may in the longer term challenge US military power, which is based on its 
economic strength. There is no doubt that the gap between the countries is reducing, but in the optic 
of this paper, a take on of the existing hegemonic order is not of current relevance as the challenge 
only happens on the economic level. 
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1.0 Intro 
1.1 Introduction 
In the wake of World War II, the United States (US) and the USSR became the two major powers 
of the world. With the breakdown of the communist regime in 1991, and the “victory” of 
democracy, the United States became the sole major power and obtained hegemonic status in the 
world society which it seemed successful in trying to preserve for decades (Chomsky.info 2011).  
However, times are changing and the discussion of the US’ hegemonic status is raging, as numerous 
contenders, such as the BRIC countries
1
, have been rising within the last decades. A number of 
scholars argue that the hegemonic status of the US is declining and their global power decreasing. 
They strongly doubt on the American ability to uphold its unique power (Haas 2008: 46; Chase-
Dunn et al 2011: 2). 
“What is most likely to happen in the next ten years is that the United States will get hurt politically, 
economically, and possibly even militarily in various ways. The United States’ reaction to such 
developments is very uncertain at this point. The United States may become internally split to the 
point of virtual civil war.”(Wallerstein 2005: 26)  
Oppositely, several scholars argue that this view is erroneous and that the US’ hegemonic status 
isn’t threatened (Beckley: 2011). One of them is Chan, who stresses that a Sino-American power 
transition “is unlikely to materialize the next three decades or so at the earliest, if at all” (Chan 
2008: 9) 
 
This thesis will be based on the view that China is challenging US hegemony. The deterioration of 
the latter is related to the rise of “the rest”, as non-western countries have experienced significant 
economic growth for decades, and that especially the rise of China is now indicating a threat to the 
US (World bank.org). 
 
“…China has rapidly emerged as a major regional power, averaging over 9 percent economic 
growth since the introduction of its market reforms in 1978. Foreign businesses have flocked to 
invest in China, while Chinese exports have begun to flood world markets. China is modernizing its 
                                                 
1
 Referring to Brazil, Russia, India and China being the four largest emerging market economies (Nationalbanken.dk) 
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military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and is increasingly visible in 
international politics” (Kang 2007: 3). 
 
Numerous scholars argue that China is challenging US hegemony (Medeiros & Fravel; Layne). This 
project will examine the evolution of the relations between the two countries, which outcome 
remains unknown. Despite the possible decline of the US, it isn’t predestined that China will gain 
the upper hand. The power-balance between the two states could evolve in a more equal way, based 
primarily on their economic ties, but also political ones. However, it could end up in a military 
conflict, caused by some of the tensions between the countries, mainly concentrated in the Asian 
region, where the US has a number of allies and a large presence.  
In case of such a conflict, the consequences could be dramatic for both states, but also the rest of the 
world, which is highly dependent on the US and China. A conflict of such kind would involve 
numerous allies, and could potentially transform the conflict into a global issue (Cossa 1998: 5). 
Although there might be disagreements on whether China is filling the throne of the US, there is no 
doubt about the tensions in the region and their potential escalation. The current crisis about the fly 
zone dispute delineates that in a brilliant way. It pictures that China is heading towards a more 
aggressive direction with the recent creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone, a fly zone that 
overlaps the already established zones of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, who see it as a 
provocative move (USA Today.com). The US, too, see it as a Chinese attempt to change the status 
quo (The Guardian.com) These increasing tensions could indicate that a future conflict is possible. 
The destructive potential of such a conflict makes it very important and up-to-date to examine. 
 
We see it as relevant to investigate the chances of the escalation of such a conflict, and whether the 
relationship between the US and China is developing in similar or diverging directions. No matter 
how this development ends up, it will have an extensive impact on the rest of the world, as a war 
between the US and China will influence the outcome of a new global balance of power, and decide 
the countries’ place in the world, both politically, economically and military (Hunkovic 2009: 28).  
The various opinions about the decline of the US and the rise of China have created the foundation 
of our hypothesis, which acts as a departure point for this project. The hypothesis is the following: 
China is challenging US hegemony.  
In order to examine the ongoing hegemonic struggle between China and the United States, the focus 
has been narrowed down to the most important areas of Sino-American relations: the countries 
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surrounding the East-and South China Seas, and of course, the US (Figure 1 see appendix). In this 
region, much of the Sino-American history focuses on Taiwan, which has been, and still is, a key 
factor in their relationship. It has been an issue for China since the National Party lost the civil war 
in 1949 and fled to Taiwan. Since then, both countries have claimed the right to rule the island. In 
the meantime, the US has been protecting Taiwan against retaliatory attack from China, and signed 
a declaration promising to help Taiwan if needed (Council on Foreign Relations.org). Taiwan has 
always been an issue of great tension between the two states: 
 
“As the World Wars were in the previous century, an armed confrontation between the People’s 
Republic of China, Taiwan and the United States could prove to be of the most defining events in 
world history. There are few countries in the world which do not have political and economic ties 
with China and the United States and who would not directly or indirectly affected by such a 
conflict” (Hunkovic 2009: 1) 
 
The complexity of the Sino-American relationship is reflected in the way that the US and China act 
in relation to Taiwan. Numerous observers mention Taiwan as the only issue that can lead to an 
actual armed conflict between the US and China (Huffington Post; CNN.com; Stimson.org).  
On the other hand, the two countries are highly dependent on each other economically. What do the 
two states prioritize, increased regional power or economic cooperation?  
In order to cover the aspects of the Sino-American liaison in relation to East-Asian regional 
dynamics, two different theoretical perspectives are singled out: John Mearsheimer’s theory of 
offensive realism, which focuses on states’ strive for hegemony and the use of military force, and 
Keohane & Nye’s theory of complex interdependence, which focuses on cooperation and peaceful 
co-existence. These theories will be the basis for assessing whether China’s rise is challenging US 
hegemony. 
 
Based on a possible change in the power balance and our objective to assess and discuss these 
matters in relation to the East-Asian region and the theoretical standpoints, the following question is 
outlined: 
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1.2 Main question 
 
Can China’s challenge to US hegemony be assessed through John Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism and Keohane & Nye’s complex interdependence with special 
attention to the two countries’ relationship to regional dynamics? 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
Part 1 
- How has the relationship between the US and China changed since the Great Aberration 
(1979)? 
 
- How has the foreign policy of the US and China been towards Taiwan since the Great 
Aberration? 
 
Part 2 
  
- How does offensive realism explain the actions of the US/China towards each other, in 
relation to regional dynamics? 
  
- How does complex interdependence explain the actions of the US/China towards each other, 
in relation to regional dynamics? 
 
Part 3 
- Based on a discussion of the theoretical positions of offensive realism and complex 
interdependence can one argue that China is challenging the relative hegemonic status of the 
US? 
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1.4 Explanation of main question 
In order to assess whether China challenges the hegemonic status of the US, it is necessary to 
clarify our perception of the concept of hegemony. In this project, hegemony is viewed as a 
situation of “clear acknowledged, leadership and dominant influence by one unit within a 
community of units not under a single authority” (Scheidel 2006: 4). Furthermore, a hegemon 
provides order by setting up institutions, and create norms which spread is “tied to economic and 
military capabilities (traditional) great power, which can use them to enforce norms” (Diez 2013: 
199). 
The view on China’s challenge to US hegemony will mostly be evaluated through economic and 
military aspects. When concluding the project, a challenge of the hegemonic status of the US by 
China would thus imply a challenge on more than one of the abovementioned facets of hegemony. 
This will be an appraisal of whether China challenges US hegemony, and not whether they fill the 
position of a new hegemon.  
Regional dynamics cover the happenings in the geographic area around Taiwan and the surrounding 
seas (the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait). However, the major focus 
will be on Taiwan, since it is an issue of great historical importance, both for China and the United 
States. 
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2.0 Methods & theory of science 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Project Design 
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2.1.2 Explanation of the project design & analytical strategy 
This section is to be read in relation to the project design. Behind the structure of this thesis, lie 
several strategic considerations.  
The first two boxes are the introduction and main question, where the purpose of this paper is 
presented. 
Subsequently, our methods section is presented. This chapter explains how the project is 
constructed and what role the different components of the thesis play. Furthermore, important 
issues, such as validity and limitations, are discussed and considered. 
In order to add structure to the project, the included theories have been split up in four different 
concepts (only three of them are used in the analysis), which act as a frame for the further analysis 
of US and China’s actions towards regional dynamics, and for the discussion. The concepts are: 
economy, military, interests, and perception of change (the latter is only used in the discussion). 
Economy and military are self-evident, as they deal with the economic and military policies of US 
and China towards the region. The part regarding interest accounts for the different countries’ 
interests according to the different theories and the specific context. 
Next, a historical overview of the Sino-American relationship, with focus on Taiwan, will bring 
empirical data into play (which later will be used in the analysis), including economic, military and 
political aspects from 1979 till today. The first part of the overview will be about China and the US, 
omitting focus on Taiwan. This is an intentional choice, as the implementation of the two countries’ 
relationship on a global scale is perceived as important for the project. It can give an idea of their 
position in world order, and thus whether China challenges the US hegemony. When this part has 
been introduced, a “funnel-shaped” procedure is adopted, bringing the scale down from a global 
scene to the very specific case of Taiwan, by having a look at the Sino-American policies towards 
the island. The historical overview gradually provides new knowledge, which progressively 
contributes to the satisfactory answering of the problem formulation of this paper.  
The analysis of our thesis takes a starting point in the theory. Overall, it will be divided into two 
main parts; the one where each country’s behavior since 1979 is analyzed according to offensive 
realism, and the other where it is examined through complex interdependence. This will give 
indications of the purpose of the actions of China and the United States towards the region. 
Moreover, the analysis is structured according to the elaborated concepts, where the Chinese and 
American interests are assessed, according to the two theories. Furthermore, the Sino-American 
relations will be analyzed from an economic and military point of view. 
All four concepts are used in the discussion part, whereas the “perception of change” concept is 
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only used in the discussion, as the two theories’ perception of change is relevant for drawing any 
conclusion regarding China’s challenging of US hegemony. By having a high level of structuring of 
the analytical and discussing parts of the thesis, it ensures that the best results are achieved, and that 
we succeed in getting as much information as possible from the implemented theory and empirical 
data. Each concept is analyzed in relation to the empirical data, whether they are qualitative or 
quantitative, and examined through the theories’ ideas of how those issues can be understood. At 
the end of the analysis, a brief summary will be made, in order to unify the two parts of the analysis 
and the findings made in the latter.  
The concepts can therefore be seen as tools that will form the basis of our analysis and the further 
discussion.  
On that basis, the aim of the project is to discuss whether China is challenging the relative 
hegemonic status of the United States, based on a discussion of the employed theoretical 
approaches. These different parts of the project aim at contributing to the overall conclusion. 
Lastly, the intention is to include a perspectives section, where we reflect upon what alternative 
angles would have meant for the project. These alternatives could be inclusion of other theories, 
cases or different methods of data collection. Furthermore, this section comprises contemplations on 
how this thesis could have been refined. 
 
2.1.3 Choice of theory 
In the process of answering our main question, two theoretical approaches have been chosen to help 
achieving a satisfactory conclusion. Thus, the relationship between China and the US will be seen 
from two diverging points of view, arguing differently for whether China is challenging the US 
hegemony or not, and therefore giving a better understanding of issues connected to a possible shift 
in power balance. Through this choice of theoretical approaches, we will try to create a contrast 
between a neo-realist and a neo-liberal point of view, which is why diverging theories are 
implemented in the project. 
 
John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism has a neo-realistic point of departure, and sees military 
confrontational issues as essential.  The other theory, complex interdependence by Keohane & Nye, 
has a focus on cooperation between different actors in the international society. It is a neo-liberal 
theory. 
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The two theories have been chosen, as the economic and military aspects of the Sino-American 
relations are seen as essential in analyzing the power balance between them. In the light of this, 
complex interdependence and offensive realism have been singled out, as they perceive economy 
and military as being crucial features of actors’ behavior in the international society. 
Additionally, having two disparate theories, that complement each other, broadens the spectrum of 
the project, and enhances our chances of explaining the two countries’ actions. 
There will most likely be certain issues that either theory might not be able to answer, which is 
another reason for choosing more than one theoretical perspective. This will be discussed in the 
latter part of the project.   
 
2.1.4 Choice of empirical data 
In the process of examining the changing power balance between China and the US, different types 
of empirical data are included. In quantitative research, the focus is mainly on the descriptive and 
statistical aspect of the data (hard data). They easily create an overview of an issue, offers very 
tangible knowledge and insight into the variables.  
In this project, the quantitative data is used to get contextualized and factual data about the actions 
and policies of China/US in regards to the regional dynamics. This is done by implementing 
different indicators (such as GDP, import/export), describing the two states’ military and economic 
relation to Taiwan and the region in general. 
The strength of these types of data is generalizability and testability, since others may get the exact 
same results using the same questionnaire (Harboe 2011: 46f). The aim is to get representative, 
generalizable and descriptive information. 
In addition to quantitative data, qualitative data, or soft data, is also used. It investigates subjects in 
an open manner and cannot apply as standardized methods, as they imply prior knowledge. Hence, 
qualitative data is used in a more flexible way, since it is open to new and surprising information. It 
aims at achieving specific, contextual knowledge, which is not necessarily representative or 
generalizable (Ibid: 47f). An example of a qualitative source in the project is the interview with 
adjunct Camilla T. N. Sørensen, from Copenhagen University (KU). The interview process will be 
further elaborated below. 
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Interview 
As a qualitative data source, an expert interview was made. Both because it generates some material 
to analyze through our theories, but also because it has creates an inside knowledge that would have 
been impossible to achieve from quantitative data. 
The interview person is Camilla T.N. Sørensen from Copenhagen University. She has researched in 
areas such as Chinese defense, domestic and foreign politics, and the Chinese-US relations on 
security-politics. Furthermore, she has done research on the development in the Taiwan Strait, and 
on Taiwanese domestic policies. Currently she lives in Beijing, where she works as a visiting 
researcher at the School of International Studies at Peking University. At present, she conducts a 
research about “What kind of power will China be?” (Ku.dk). 
The expert interview is a semi-standardized interview, as our interview-guide was prepared in 
advance, with specific formulations. Still, it was open for new formulations and/or additional 
questions in between the existing ones, if we evaluated that a point was worth being clarified. 
Hence, the interview can be characterized as semi-structured, as the order was fixed in advance, but 
flexible towards the emergence of new questions (Harboe 2011: 72). A qualitative interview 
generally includes open-ended questions, as “close-ended response categories may seem as a 
limitation of the amount of information being collected” (Ibid: 72ff). This questioning technique is 
applied to neutralize the reduction of relevant data. Although the interview guide was prepared in 
advance with specific questions, it was prepared in such a way that it was flexible towards new 
information and points, as the aim with the interview was to achieve as much knowledge as possible 
(Ibid: 75). 
  
The interview has been carried out using Skype, making it a telephone interview. We are aware that 
there are important differences between a face to face interview and an interview facilitated over 
Skype. An interview via a computer is not suitable for long interviews, because it implies the risk of 
tiring the respondent (Ibid: 82). But there are also several positive aspects about such an interview: 
it can be quickly carried out, it is very affordable and gives fast results (Gubrium 2002: 540). 
Furthermore, the personal contact with the respondent ensures that the questions are understood in 
the right way and that they all are answered. The length of the interview was short, as it lasted for 
about 40 minutes. 
As said, the interview is a part of our empirical data, and because only one interview (and thus one 
respondent) is included in the project, it will not act as the backbone of our analysis. This could 
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make the project too biased, as Camilla Sørensen’s view isn’t challenged by a counterpart (another 
respondent). Consequently, the interview will only serve as a supplement and a part of the general 
body of qualitative and quantitative empirical data. 
 
2.1.5 Validity 
Through the process, numerous reflections have been made concerning the validity of this thesis 
and the way it has been elaborated. The process of evaluating the degree of validity of a project 
makes it important to minutely ponder the different possibilities in the procedure of collecting data 
and material, whether it is theoretical or empirical. Validation is a big part of investigation, 
permanently checking, questioning and theoretically interpreting the findings (Kvale 1989: 77). In 
this part, we will discuss choices related to interview, case, theory, empirical data and the way they 
are used. Parts of the included qualitative empirical data are based upon the interview with Camilla 
T.N Sørensen. The interview will, as said above, be used as a supplement for the analysis. However, 
it is necessary to have in mind, that even though Camilla T. N Sørensen is an expert on the subject, 
her claims are not the definite truth. Therefore, we have been careful not to exalt her statements and 
data extracted from the interview. Validation of an interview consists of continually questioning the 
interpretations explicated in the interview (Kvale 1989 : 80). In order to avoid getting a too biased 
project, Camilla T.N. Sørensen’s statements are used as a supplement to existing empirical data. 
Thus, when included, it will underpin existing data. This choice has been made for compensating 
the lacking of another interview to oppose Camilla Sørensen’s statements. 
In order to narrow the focus of the project, the Sino-American relations are analyzed towards the 
actions regarding the regional dynamics. This is a way of confining the examined field, so as to 
shape the project in a proper, structured way. It adds transparency and makes it a realistic project to 
complete in the allowed time and space lapse. Those aspects have been minutely considered when 
choosing the case. The choice of the latter sharpens the structure and the aim of this paper. 
However, the focus on the dynamics in the Asian region is used to describe the existing relations 
between China and the United States. This implies some limitations, as it potentially leaves out 
some important points, sharpening and explaining their relationship. 
In this project, we try to explain the Sino-American relationship based on their policies and actions 
in the Asian region. Therefore, we have used the regional dynamics as a case to present the Sino-
American relationship. In the project, there will be focus on the Sino-American actions toward 
maritime issues surrounding the seas closely connected with China, but also with a specific focus on 
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Taiwan. This is done, as Taiwan has been seen as a highly important issue for a long time. 
Furthermore, the case of Taiwan is, as shown in the introduction, seen by many as the only issue 
that can potentially lead to a military conflict between the US and China.   
 
On the theoretical level, the focus is on offensive realism and complex interdependence. This has an 
important impact on the project and how it is shaped. Accordingly, the selection of theories has to 
be a carefully thought out process. The analysis of the empirical data, through the eyes of those two 
theories, will reveal some important aspects of the issues included in the thesis, but also leave out 
several others that would have been included by other theoretical approaches. But as the economic 
and military aspects are essential, offensive realism and complex interdependence are considered 
the best fitted analytical tools for the project. Thus, the relationship between China and the US can 
be scrutinized in several other ways. This will be elaborated further in section 8. 
 
Besides from the interview, several other sources of qualitative and quantitative data are 
implemented. To assure the validity of the included data, it is important to take a critical position 
towards these.  
  
2.1.7 Limitations 
A part of the process of writing a project is to consider the limitations in the thesis, in order to get a 
better structure and understanding of the examined material. Thus, different aspects and areas 
remain untouched. Time and the available resources play an important role in the studied field, and 
create natural limitations. As described, the paper investigates the changing power balance between 
the US and China, using their actions toward regional dynamics as a case. This case has been 
chosen, because of the increasingly tense relations between the United States and China in this 
region. Other cases could have been chosen to broaden the implemented actors, and this would have 
been beneficial for elaborating a representative conclusion. But because of the time available, one 
case is the most optimal way of analyzing the relations between China and the US. Moreover, using 
more than one case would have been too extensive and might create more confusion than clarity. 
History tells much about how the relationship has changed in the past thirty years. The time span in 
the project stretches from the great aberration (1979) till present day. These dates were selected, as 
the great aberration marks a turning point in the Sino-American liaisons, as it was the day where the 
government on the Chinese mainland was diplomatically recognized by the United States. In our 
 Page 19 of 96 
 
opinion, expanding the time span would not make that much sense, since China has been through an 
enormous transformation in a small amount of time. Thus, what happened 80 years ago doesn’t 
seem relevant for the project. 
 
Offensive realism and complex interdependence are used to analyze the Sino-American 
relationship, and explain the two countries’ behavior according to the utilized case. As mentioned in 
section 2.1.3, it creates a good basis for the analyzed data in this paper. A choice of two political 
theories limits the opportunities of examining the topic from numerous other angles, which could 
have been relevant, as it is a complex problematic. Different theories and data would potentially 
have entailed different conclusions and deliberations. Different theories have also been in 
consideration, for example constructivism, which has a focus on human awareness and 
consciousness (Jackson & Sørensen: 209). The choice of constructivism would have created 
completely different concepts than those of military and economy, transforming a lot of aspects of 
the thesis. 
 
For further theoretical and empirical limitations, please look at the sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. 
 
2.1.8 Methodology 
In order to investigate the changing power balance between China and the US, a deductive social 
research strategy has been singled out. Deduction is a process where “The researcher, on the basis 
of what is known about a particular domain and theoretical  considerations in relation to that 
domain, deduces a hypothesis (or hypotheses) that must then be subjected to empirical scrutiny” 
(Bryman 2012: 24).  
As mentioned in the analytical strategy, the main question is grounded on a hypothesis, suggesting 
that China is challenging the relative hegemonic status of the United States. This hypothesis is set 
up on the existing literature regarding the Sino-American relationship. 
In the process of confirming or disconfirming the hypothesis, data has been collected (empirical 
data + theoretical approaches). The combination of these tools leads to findings that make it 
possible to confirm or deny the point of departure of this thesis, namely the hypothesis (Ibid). 
Depending on the included analytical instruments’ contribution to the project, the hypothesis will 
either be falsified or confirmed. But it cannot be proved false or right, as we only study it according 
to specific elements and considerations, leaving out several aspects that potentially could contradict 
the ones implemented in this paper. 
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Thus, the hypothesis, the dependent variable, is examined through the empirical data and theoretical 
approaches, the independent variables. 
According to the section concerning critical realism (see section 2.2), abstraction is applied in this 
project. Abstraction is a kind of thought-experiment that counterbalance the scientific experiments. 
Through abstraction, one has to isolate the most important mechanisms and forces in one’s thoughts 
(according to a concrete context) (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2012: 305).  
In order to create a better understanding, the usage of abstraction is exemplified according to the 
following thesis. The isolated mechanisms and forces are the embodied concepts used in the project 
(view on change, military, economy and interest), which have a particular influence on our specific 
context, which is China’s potential challenge to the relative hegemonic status of the US. This paper 
assesses, how the existing concepts work in relation to the power balance between China and the 
US, and what impact they have on the issue. A specific example of abduction in this project of this 
is explicated in the theory of science section (Section 2.2, the intransitive dimension). 
Abstraction is important to consider in this specific paper, as the reflection about the underlying 
mechanisms and the isolation of those, which were divided into the different concepts, makes us 
able to identify, what different aspects do influence the overall power balance between China and 
the United States. The separation of the different mechanisms creates a possibility of measuring 
their respective influence on the specific context, making it possible to test what impact they have 
on the relation between China and the US. 
 
2.2 Theory of science 
In this chapter, we wish to present the theory of science in our thesis. These discussions and 
thoughts will give an insight to what lies behind the research we are conducting, and a better 
understanding of how we see our research. 
In this project an ad hoc method has been used on the theory of science perspective, implying that 
issues in relation to theory of science have raised gradually, as revealed in the process (Olsen & 
Pedersen 2001: 144). This method is often used, and has naturally been developed in the process. 
Critical realism is based on the idea that there exists a world beyond that of the one we know of.  
 
Ontology 
In critical realism, the ontology focuses on creating knowledge about the world. Critical realism 
argues that there is a world independently of the human knowledge about it, and that objects doesn’t 
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transform even though science’s perception of them does. Consequently, ontology is seen as 
essential compared to epistemology, as there is an important contrast between knowledge and 
existence (Ibid). In order to create knowledge, critical realists divide their view of the world into 
three domains:     
 
·         The domain of empirical which consist of what is possible to experiences, our experiences 
and observation. 
·          The domain of actual which consists of the events and phenomenon of the world, 
independent of our knowledge of them. 
·         The domain of the real which consists of the mechanism and structure, that creates the 
events. (Bhaskar 1975:13)(Sørensen:281f) 
 
The domain of the empirical is those experiences and observations we have done about China, the 
US and the Asian region. The actual domain consists of all the phenomena and events that exists 
and takes place and thus where we gain our knowledge from. What we gain our knowledge from is 
thus based on something which exists beyond our knowledge about it. In the introduction we have 
accounted for what we have observed at the actual level: a growing belief among many scholars that 
China is challenging the hegemonic status of the US. This is what can be observed at the actual 
level and what is shaping our hypothesis. 
 
But the purpose for us as critical realist is to create knowledge about how structures and 
mechanisms are creating what can be seen at the actual domain. Science for a critical realist is 
therefore related with moving from the actual level to the real level and back again. Through this 
process the events on the actual domain is explained from underlying mechanism, structure and 
relations on the real level. (Sørensen:304). In critical realism the researcher therefore seeks to create 
knowledge about the structures and mechanisms at the real level. 
At the real level, structures are affecting and creating mechanisms. From there mechanisms have the 
potential to trigger events on the actual level, but at the same time, this development is affected by 
other conditions such as other events. Roy Baskhar describes this in the following way: 
 
"The world consists of mechanisms not events. Such mechanisms combine to generate the 
flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world" (Bhaskar:47) 
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In this project, an example of this is China’s increasing military capabilities that can be said to be a 
structure. Their increasing military power is therefore a structure that is affecting the mechanism of 
China’s actions and policies towards Taiwan. But it’s not only China’s own military power that is 
affecting this mechanism. E.g. the US military power and the potential consequences for China’s 
economic relations to US in case of conflict can be said to have an influence on how the actual 
mechanism of China’s actions towards Taiwan is carried out. 
 
Epistemology 
The epistemological aspect of critical realism claims that knowledge is anthropogenic and that new 
knowledge must be produced by developing contemporary knowledge (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 
2010: 284). Furthermore, knowledge is often based on history and how we view this (Ibid: 285). 
This is clearly shown in chapter 4 when using a historical overview to produce an understanding of 
what has and does shape the Sino–American relationship in regards to regional dynamics. 
 
In the perspective of critical realism, we as researcher, shall restrict ourselves to try explaining past 
and current events as knowledge is anthropogenic. As a result of the anthropogenic nature of 
knowledge, critical realism thus recognizes that knowledge can be fallible and temporary. In the 
project we follow this assumption but we also differ from it to some degree. The project tries to 
explain past and contemporary events and their underlying mechanisms structures. From these 
deeper mechanisms and structures one can observe tendencies in the Sino – American relationship 
which can be used in order to explain the main question. We use these tendencies to examine 
whether China’s actions could be seen as a tendency towards a more aggressive and hegemon 
aspiring position. 
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3.0 Theory 
In this chapter, the included theoretical approaches will be presented. In order to structure the 
theories and analysis, the theories will be divided into four concepts. These concepts are interest, 
economy, military and perception of change. Each of them will be used to make the fusion between 
the theory and our empirical data. The concept of interest accounts for the states’ objectives in 
relation to the used theory. The economy and military concepts are related to their accorded 
importance within the theories. View on change is about how the theories perceive major changes in 
the international political landscape.  
 
3.1 Offensive Realism 
This project, takes a look into the neo-realist theoretical approach and how its conception of the 
world. As a representative of the neo-realist approach, John Mearsheimer has been singled out, 
contributing with his theory of offensive realism, working on with the ideas of his fellow neo-realist 
Kenneth Waltz. 
Kenneth Waltz takes his starting point in classical realism, by claiming that independent states exist 
and operate in a world of anarchy. From there on he moves away from the classical approach. 
Waltz´s neo-realism is greatly influenced by economics and focused on the structure of the system. 
In Waltz´s view all states are alike. They may have different cultures and ideologies, but all states 
perform the same tasks: taxes, foreign policy, creating legislations etc. States are only different in 
their varying capabilities. Mearsheimer took up those arguments and applied them to the past and 
future of international society and history (Jackson & Sørensen 2012: 82). 
 
 
3.1.1 Interest 
As Waltz, Mearsheimer sees the behavior of states determined by the anarchical structure of the 
international system. But he differs from Waltz in terming him a “defensive realist”, which implies 
a view arguing that states must seek power to survive, but that excessive power is counterproductive 
because it provokes other states. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, sees himself as an “offensive 
realist”. He defines a hegemon as being “... a country that is so powerful that it dominates all the 
other states… A hegemon is the only great power in the system” (Mearsheimer 2010: 387). As he 
sees it, states seek hegemony and are therefore aggressive. The goal for a country like the US is to 
dominate the system because it wants to be assured that it can’t be threatened by any other powers. 
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All major powers strive for this, but since the world is too big, a great power cannot dominate the 
entire world and become a global hegemon. When a state acquires the status of regional hegemon, it 
becomes, according to Mearsheimer, a status quo power (Mearsheimer 2004: 185). It then strives at 
preventing regional hegemons to emerge in other geographical regions (Mearsheimer 2010: 388). 
When a distant hegemon tries to contain an arising potential hegemon it is called “offshore 
balancing” (Mearsheimer 2004: 186). That is what the US is trying to do and has been trying to do 
since the Monroe Doctrine from 1823 (Jackson & Sørensen 2012: 83f). 
 If China was to become the regional hegemon in Asia, it would be expected that the US will react 
and go to great lengths to try to prevent this, ensuring China wouldn’t intervene in other parts of the 
world where US interests are at stake. (Jackson & Sørensen 2012: 85) For a regional hegemon like 
the US it is to prefer that there are at least two great powers in another region. When this is the case, 
it is likely that these two states will mainly concentrate on each other, and none of them will 
become a regional hegemon that has the capability to challenge US power (Mearsheimer 2004 : 
186). Mearsheimer regards his theory as useful for all places at all times. States will always struggle 
for power and domination in the international system. There will always be conflicts.  
As for the international society and the cooperation that takes place here, Mearsheimer argues that 
great powers want to maximize their own gain which is likely to result in a sustainable and secure 
world system. As he sees it, states are not driven by a desire to build a world society of peace, but 
largely on narrow calculations of relative power. The buildup of the world society and how it works 
is therefore not a result of states working together, but great powers competing for power. 
Sometimes there will be a stable order in the international society, as seen during the Cold War, but 
despite that states will still seek to optimize their share of power. That means that if a favorable 
situation occurs it can secure a greater share of power for a state, as it will try to take advantage of it 
(Mearsheimer 2004: 192f). 
To sum up, the main objective for a state is to achieve regional hegemony. A state will always 
struggle for domination in the international society and try to prevent other states from becoming 
hegemons in another region. States are not driven by a desire to achieve world peace, but by a 
narrow calculation of relative power to maximize their winnings. A state will do so for any means 
and will even try to undermine a stable world power, if that is in the state’s interest. 
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3.1.2 Military 
As for military power, Mearsheimer distinguishes between two types: potential and actual power. 
The potential power of a state is measured on the size of its population and the level of wealth in the 
country. These two components are the building blocks of a large and strong army. The actual 
power of a state is mainly measured in the size and capability of its army. 
There are different ways of pursuing power; one of them is balancing. Balancing is the most 
important way of checking a potential aggressor, either by fighting or deterring it. There are two 
kinds of balancing; internal and external balancing. The internal balancing implies a heavy 
investment in military capabilities, creating an internal build-up. The external part essentially 
includes forming military alliances, where states share the burden of handling the aggressor. 
Alliances can, however, be inefficient and take time to form (Mearsheimer 2001: 156f). National 
unification is another way of complementing the pursuit of power, according to Mearsheimer 
(Mearsheimer 2004: 190f). Another way of maximizing power is ‘bandwagoning’, which consists 
of allying with a more powerful state than oneself in order to get protection against an opponent. 
However, this technique is criticized by Mearsheimer, as it is against the balance of power logic, 
because it makes concessions to another stronger state. This strategy is to be avoided (Toft 2005: 
386). 
In Mearsheimer’s view, some features make states in the international society fear each other. The 
three main reasons are: 1) the absence of a central authority above states that can protect them from 
each other; 2) The fact that states always have some military capabilities; 3) that states can never be 
certain about each other’s intentions. Because of these conditions, every state’s goal is to be as 
powerful as possible, as it is the best way to secure their survival (Mearsheimer 2004: 184). 
 
According to Mearsheimer there are three main elements that can influence the level of fear 
between states. The first is that of nuclear force. States having this capability are likely to fear each 
other less, as they are of great deterrence. Another factor that can affect the fear between two states 
is oceans. Oceans are formidable obstacles that can make it very hard to attack the other states, and 
make it an outbreak of a war much less likely. The third reason is the distribution of power, whether 
it is evenly distributed among the great powers or whether this distribution is uneven (Mearsheimer 
2004: 188f). States’ fear of each other is subsequently determined by the probability of war and the 
severity of the security competition: “The more profound the fear is, the more intense is the security 
competition and the more likely is war.” (Ibid: 187) According to Mearsheimer, there is one 
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exception to this; when both states have nuclear weapons, as they can inflict devastating destruction 
on each other, and therefore will make the state more reluctant to use them (Ibid: 187f). 
To sum up, Mearsheimer mentions actual and potential power, the difference between the military 
capability of a state and the number of its population and wealth. When talking about military 
capabilities, Mearsheimer argues that an investment in a state’s economy and wealth actually is an 
investment in its military. To why states do fear each other, the reasons are several: no authority, 
military capabilities and the uncertainty about intention. In addition to these reasons, factors like 
nuclear capabilities, an uneven distribution of power and oceans can also affect the fear between 
powers. 
 
3.1.3 Economy 
Mearsheimer’s theory can seem a bit negative, but despite this he maintains that it is wrong to claim 
that his theory doesn’t allow cooperation. States can cooperate, although it can be somewhat 
difficult to do and sustain. According to offensive realism, two essential factors are hindering the 
emergence of cooperation: relative gains and cheating. The notion of relative gains is applied when 
a state is concerned about its own gain, but also the other sides’. This is because of their focus on 
the balance of power, which makes the actors interested in how much the other actor is gaining 
from their cooperation. The state must make sure that it doesn’t do worse than the other states, but 
hopefully do better. A relative gains approach to cooperation can secure a balance, however it is a 
more difficult way than the absolute gains approach, where each side only is concerned by its own 
gains (Mearsheimer 2004 : 195). As for cheating, Mearsheimer argues that one can never be sure of 
the other states’ intentions. Suspicion is reigning in the international society, and it does too in 
situations of cooperation, as states fear that their counterpart will cheat despite agreements. If these 
two aspects can be surpassed, then great powers can cooperate in a realist world (Ibid).  
Mearsheimer argues that states can have non-security goals, like an investment in economy and 
wealth for the population. But these investments are actually still an investment in a better military 
and security. A strong economy and a strong and wealthy population, is the basis of a strong 
military. These go hand in hand. Sometimes investments in non-security can actually cross the line 
of the power balance logic. He gives an example with the US: they have wanted to spread 
democracy to other states and have been doing so. On the other hand, it has overthrown democratic 
governments and supported non-democratic regimes when it has been in their best interest. That 
shows that there is a line to cross when it comes to non-security questions.  
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Because great powers care about power balance, they tend to emphasize on relative gains rather 
than absolute gains when considering cooperation. That complicates cooperation a lot, as states 
primarily do it for their own benefit. The actors want to achieve power at the collaborator’s 
expense. In spite of that, states create alliances in order to cooperate against enemies, as a result of 
the balance of power logic (Mearsheimer 2004: 195f). 
As said, Mearsheimer does come across cooperation, but he argues that it is a very difficult area for 
states to succeed in. A state has to consider what it gains through either absolute or relative gains. 
Although a part of his theory processes cooperation, Mearsheimer clearly expresses his focus: “No 
amount of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competition,” (Ibid).  
 
3.1.4 Perception of change 
What makes offensive realism different from defensive realism is the state’s offensive behavior. 
The state, which holds hegemony in its region, will tend to contain other emerging powers, as they 
have the capabilities to threaten the regional hegemon’s share of world power (Mearsheimer 2004: 
186). Considering absolute gains, states will merely concentrate on increasing their overall power, 
according to some particular standards. However, it becomes more complicated when considering 
relative gains, where one state’s gain of power includes another state’s loss of power. Then, other 
emerging powers are potential threats for the regional hegemon, and it is inevitable for those states 
to clash in order to secure and maximize their power. However, conflicts do not occur 
simultaneously with the appearance of other emerging powers, and can be delayed. The 
international order can be maintained peacefully when it matches each state’s interest. States will 
avoid war when they are likely to be the victim, the Cold War being a prime example (Mearsheimer 
2004: 192-193). But peace is always temporary. States keep seeking opportunities to increase their 
share of world power, and grab favorable opportunities even if they undermine the stable world 
order (Ibid : 193). The regional hegemon will try to secure and solidify its position, while great 
powers will try to become new regional hegemons. Finally, when a new regional hegemon appears, 
it takes a far bigger share of world power than prior powerful regional hegemons, and the 
international order will be reconstructed in the favor of the new regional hegemon.  
The system structure changes according to the distribution of capabilities among the existing actors 
in the system. When these capabilities change, so does world order. Hence, shifts in the 
international system happen “when great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts 
accordingly. A typical means of such change is great power war.” (Jackson & Sørensen: 80). 
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3.2 Complex Interdependence 
 
Robert Keohane’s criticism of Waltz 
In his attempt to refute the neorealist notions of Kenneth Waltz, Keohane argues in his book “After 
Hegemony”: “If international politics were a state of war, institutionalized patterns of cooperation 
on the basis of shared purposes should not exist except as part of a larger struggle for power.” 
(Keohane 1984:7) He continues to say that if this intense global competition really existed, the 
extensive patterns of agreements observed on issues such as trade, financial relations, health, 
telecommunication and environmental protection would be nowhere to be found (Ibid). Common 
interests and goals are enough for states to overcome their suspicions of one another, and there is no 
reason, logical or empirical, why mutual interests should be limited to interests in combining forces 
against potential enemies (Ibid: 62). 
Keohane & Nye do not argue that complex interdependence reflects world political reality – it is an 
ideal type along with the realist portrait, and most situations will fall somewhere between the two. 
Complex interdependence will often make a better portrait of reality (Keohane & Nye 2001: 21). 
 
 
3.2.1 Interest 
In their book “Power and Interdependence”, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye construct a neoliberal 
theory called “complex interdependence”, which they describe as being the opposite of realism 
(Keohane & Nye 2001: 20). They argue that the basic realist assumptions can be challenged, and 
that the result will give us a new understanding of international politics: 
 
“Each of the realist assumptions can be challenged. If we challenge them all simultaneously, we can 
imagine a world in which actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a 
clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy. 
Under these conditions – which we call the characteristics of complex interdependence – one would 
expect world politics to be very different than under realist conditions.” (Keohane & Nye 2001: 21) 
 
Three points characterize the theory of complex interdependence. First, multiple channels that 
connect societies creating numerous ties between governmental and non-governmental elites, on 
interstate, transgovernmental and transnational levels. Second, the absence of hierarchy among 
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issues, which implies that military security isn’t consistently the dominating on the agenda. The 
lack of hierarchy creates a blurred distinction between domestic and foreign issues. Third and 
finally, the minor role of military force is decreasing. As interdependence prevails and cooperation 
is emphasized, other skills are given higher priority, such as negotiation skills. For instance, 
military force becomes irrelevant in resolving economic issues among members (either of an 
alliance, or members being interdependent of each other). But as survival is perceived as the 
primary goal of a state, worst-case scenarios can potentially lead to use force in order to guarantee a 
state’s survival. Hence, military power could become relevant toward a rival bloc. (Keohane & Nye 
2001: 21ff) 
 
Keohane and Nye argue that state’s politics of agenda formation and control will become more 
important in the future, since there is no clear hierarchy among the issues. Today, some non-
military issues seem very important, while others, which are seemingly equal in importance, are 
ignored or handled quietly at a technical level. International monetary politics and multinational 
corporations have also become important, even though they have not all been high priorities on the 
interstate agendas. As the use of military force decreases, the line between domestic and foreign 
policy become less relevant, while the politics of agenda formation gets more differentiated and 
subtle. During this era of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye expect state’s agendas will 
be affected by international and domestic problems, not by threats of other states, but on other 
factors, such as economic growth (Keohane & Nye 2001:27-8). Keohane and Nye sums up how 
state’s national interests vary with different issues: “National interests will be defined differently on 
different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units” (Keohane & Nye 2001:30). 
Nevertheless, welfare is becoming the primary goal and concern of states, and transnational actors 
are of increased importance, as states do not act as coherent units. States become more preoccupied 
with “low politics” of welfare, than the “high politics” of national security. (Jackson & Sørensen 
2012: 108f). 
 
3.2.2 Military 
Realism tends to focus more on military issues and imply that the problems of foreign policy are 
imposed on states by the actions of other states. Keohane and Nye on the other hand argue, as actors 
and issues get more complex in global politics, that the use of military power is becoming less 
relevant (Keohane & Nye 2001:27-8). 
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Under conditions of complex interdependence, governments will not use military force towards 
other nations outside of their regions. Members of the same alliance would not use their military 
power to solve disagreements on economic issues, as it would be irrational. (Keohane & Nye 
2001:21-2). If all states were in an extreme state of security dilemma, then military force, supported 
by economic and other resources, would surely be the dominant power. Military power has not 
become an irrelevant power in any country but the industrialized, pluralist nations. As they don’t 
feel threatened by each other, military force is an unimportant instrument of policy. But even 
among non-democratic countries, military force still doesn’t play an important role in pursuing 
economical and welfare goals, which are becoming more important to states. That doesn’t make 
violent conflicts impossible, but the use of military is still very expensive and the consequences are 
hard to predict (Keohane & Nye 2001:23-4). Keohane and Nye see two ways for military power to 
become important political instruments again: 
 
“(1) drastic social and political change could cause force again to become an important direct 
instrument of policy and; (2) even when elites’ interests are complementary, a country that uses 
military force to protect another may have significant political influence over the other country.” 
(Keohane & Nye 2001:24) 
 
A potential armed conflict today between great powers seems rather unlikely though, especially 
since the demonstration of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the use of military 
force is often very costly. Finally, especially in Western states, there is a general opposition to 
prolonged military conflicts (Keohane & Nye 2001:24-5). 
 
3.2.3 Economy 
In creating coalitions, states are no longer limited by national boundaries. The more affected the 
world gets by complex interdependence, the more Keohane & Nye expect international politics to 
be affected by transnational relations. Government officials from various countries, tasked with 
similar assignments, may start working together on a transnational level to solve common problems. 
In an effort to achieve success, state institutions may bring in actors from foreign governments as 
allies. The US has used this strategy on numerous occasions (Keohane & Nye 2001:29-30). The 
existence of this transnational policy network leads Keohane and Nye to conclude that the 
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traditional realist assumption of states, always acting in self-interest, needs a different 
interpretation. They accuse realists of having a mechanistic view on US trade policy, while 
neglecting the importance of the role of communications (Keohane & Nye 2001:29-30). 
Complex interdependence perceives the relations between states as relying on several different 
levels and via many different actors and branches of diverse governments. This is clearly in 
opposition to the past, where relationships between states only were relations between two state 
leaders (Jackson & Sørensen 2012: 107) 
Transactions among societies are going to affect groups differently, where economic and social 
transactions will have greater effect than security ones (Keohane & Nye 2001: 29f). 
In a world with a global network of issues and transnational coalitions, international institutions 
have the potential to become political mediators in political disputes. They can take part in setting 
international agendas, help start coalition-formation and they act as political arenas (Keohane & 
Nye 2001: 30). 
 
3.2.4 Perception of change 
“The appropriate response to the changes occurring in world politics today is not to discredit the 
traditional wisdom of realism and its concern for the military balance of power, but to realize its 
limitations and to supplement it with insights from the liberal approach.” (Jackson & Sørensen 
2012: 110). 
 
As elaborated in the above mentioned quotation, complex interdependence doesn’t totally refute the 
realist idea about military power and conflicts changing world order. However, it perceives it as 
being too narrow minded, and tries to complement it with aspects from the liberal approach. If an 
issue becomes a matter of life and death, military power can be considered, thus changing the 
existing order. A drastic (social or political) change could entail the same means to be used. 
According to complex interdependence’s perception of the world, international institutions play an 
(indirect) important role in change. Their influence is increased, as they act as catalysts for 
coalition-formation, by having an impact on setting up the international agenda and being used as 
arenas for political initiatives. In that way, by creating coalitions and creating “allies” and 
cooperation, organizations have an impact on the existing order (Keohane & Nye 2001: 30) 
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This theoretical approach does, of course, state less about change in world order, than offensive 
realism does. In the latter, the main goal for the actors is to aim at hegemony, while there isn’t the 
same strive for power in complex interdependence. 
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4.0 Part I 
4.1 Historical overview 
This chapter is mainly a historical overview of the events regarding the US, China and Taiwan since 
1979. It’s structured in the following way: first part is about China-US relations, with focus on their 
position in world society and in relation to one another. The second part is regarding the Sino-
American-Taiwanese relationship, and focuses on the Chinese and American policies and actions 
towards Taiwan since 79’. The purpose of the chapter is to view how the US and China has acted 
toward Taiwan, in order to see if there has been a shift in attitude, as both their positions have 
shifted. Furthermore, the actions and policies that are highlighted in this chapter will be important 
for the analysis in the following chapter. 
 
4.1.1 China US relations (1979-2010) 
China and the US have been two important actors in the world order for the last three decades, with 
China increasing its power significantly during this time. One important aspect of this historical 
overview, and thus the Sino-American relations, is the Cold War, where the Soviet Union was a 
very important actor. It was characterized by this triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, 
the United States and China. This relationship is characterized by a turning point at the end of the 
Cold War. 
Accordingly, the circumstances have been very volatile from the 80’s till today, which has strongly 
influenced the roles and importance of China and the US in the world order. It is important to 
emphasize that it is almost impossible to draw a clear draft of their relationship, as it has been 
constantly changing, constituted of highs and lows. 
 
The Great Aberration and the period of Cold War 
This historical overview begins on March the 1
st
, 1979 (Cohen 2009: 223). This was the day the 
United States made a diplomatic recognition of the PRC as the legitimate government in China 
(People’s Republic of China). This date is commonly known as the Great Aberration. 
At this point in time, China was a developing socialist country, striving to a longstanding peaceful 
environment in order to succeed in modernization. It was also very rich in natural resources, and its 
huge market made it the world’s largest developing country (Zhang 1985: 304). On the contrary, the 
United States was a superpower, pursuing its global interests, assuring its influence on many parts 
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of the world, contending with their opposite, the Soviet Union, for superiority. The US had at the 
time a position as the world’s largest industrial country (Ibid). 
In 1980, the United States exported goods worth 3.8 billion $, and imported for 1.1 billion $. Their 
trade balance was + 2.7 billion $ (Table 1 see appendix). 
The great aberration led the two countries to a higher degree of cooperation in a lot of different 
sectors, symbolized by the United States becoming the major foreign investor in the PRC in 1984, 
which led to trade booms in the US-China relationship (Tucker 2013: 88). 
During the Cold War, every move was minutely devised. A strategic game was going on between 
the two superpowers of the time: the Soviet Union and the United States. China had traditionally 
been seen as “little brother” to the Soviet Union, but with the Great Aberration they took a clear 
step away from that position (Kim 2010: 30; Chicago tribute.com). The Chinese were increasingly 
worried about the Soviet Union as they had increased their military capabilities along the Chinese 
border. American historian Jerald A. Combs states e.g. that Mao: 
 
“… was terribly worried about China’s 4,000 – mile border with the Soviet union (…) China feared 
that as Soviet power grew, the USSR would be tempted to use force to prevent the rise of another 
great enemy.” (Kim 2010: 30) 
 
As the Soviet Union expanded close to the Chinese border, they chose to seek closer relations to the 
US. Nonetheless, their first priority was to oppose all expansionist moves, both from the US and 
USSR (Zhang 1985: 246). Many scholars see the threat of the Soviet Union to both China and the 
US as one of the main reasons for the Great Aberration, despite still having differences on a lot of 
issues. This view is shared by Camilla Sørensen, who says that China and the US: “cooperated a lot 
and there were kind of this strategic understanding on a lot of the issues that they didn’t agree on 
because they had this common enemy” (Sørensen: 0.03 – 2.18). Their relationship during the Cold 
War could therefore be said to be based on their common interests regarding the Soviet Union. 
Despite this, several trading conflicts occurred, as the one in 1983, where the United States 
protected their own textile industry by imposing restrictions on the import of Chinese textiles 
(Cohen 2009: 229). Accordingly, China constrained import of American goods in China, which 
means they have both been “obstructing” each other’s interests (Ibid). 
 
 Page 35 of 96 
 
China’s strategic importance was downgraded in 1983, as the US changed their policies and 
emphasized on working with Japan, which was seen as a new direction in US policies, moving 
towards an ideological emphasis rather than on the strategic triangle. Quickly, the US redirected 
their policies in order to improve their relationship with China. Sino-American cooperation was 
enhanced in 1984, as their bilateral trade was of 6 billion $ (Zhang 1985: 304). 
During the 80’s, there was evidence of Chinese supplying missiles and nuclear technology to 
countries less friendly to the United States, Iran and Pakistan, and against American interests in the 
Middle-East, which lead to a restriction on high technology exports from the US to China. Although 
the Chinese had denied delivering to Iran, the deliveries stopped, and the restrictions were lifted 
(Cohen 2009: 233). 
With time, China was considered an actor of increasing importance, opening up their economy to 
the outside world and liberalizing their policies. In the eyes of the world, they were improving. But 
nevertheless, the attitude in China was clearly towards hoping to achieve the same power and 
wealth as the West, but without abandoning Chinese values (Ibid: 235). 
 
Tiananmen Square as a main event 
The crisis of Tiananmen Square severely affected the Sino-American relationship. Students led 
protests taking place in Beijing, demonstrating for economic and political reforms and against 
political corruption, which escalated in June 1989.  
The Tiananmen Square Massacre worsened the US-China relations and new problems arose, such 
as disputes over textiles (see above), trade deficits, weapons sales (they were temporarily suspended 
by the US), computer software piracy, human rights etc. (Tucker 2013: 90). Furthermore, China lost 
its “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) trading status. The US required China not to violate human 
rights, if the country wanted to achieve its status again. This led to a sharp US-opposition from the 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and a freezing of the US-Chinese relation (Bader 2012:  19). 
 
At the end of the Cold War, Sino-American relations were tense and the most important impetus, 
behind cooperation, the Soviet Union, collapsed and thus disappeared the basis for cooperation 
(Tucker 2013: 90). 
During the 80’s, one of the biggest clients of Chinese goods were the US, although it only 
represented 1 % of the American investment and trade (Cohen 2009: 230). At this point, one could 
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argue that China was more dependent, both economically and technologically, on the United States, 
than oppositely. 
Nevertheless, their relations remained important. They benefitted from working together on several 
issues, such as drug-trafficking and environmental pollution (Tucker 2013: 91). 
In 1990, the US exported goods worth 4.8 billion $ to China, while importing for 15.2 $. Compared 
to 1980, their trade balance towards China was now negative (-10.4 $) (Table 1 see appendix). 
China was inevitably changing. There was a widespread view in the US that China was improving 
by opening up their economy by progressive liberalization of their politics. The American attitude 
was that with modernization, westernization would be inevitable, but the US had to realize that the 
Chinese fear of political chaos passed their repugnance of the authoritarian regime (Tucker 2013: 
91). 
 
The Post-Cold War Period 
Each time a presidential campaign in the United States was seen in the horizon, the Chinese 
expected the worst, since it meant a new set of policies to be implemented. In 1992, when Bill 
Clinton was elected, his wish was to focus on China’s meeting of human rights, but at the same 
time promised to revive the American economy (Cohen 2009: 253). Hence, it would have been 
irrational to engage a trade war with China, as the Chinese market was now of massive importance 
to the US economy. 
Clinton abandoned his concern for the Chinese violations of human rights and extended its MFN 
status (Ibid). Due to the absence of a common enemy, the Sino-American liaison was more unstable 
than in the past. Even so, it was essential for both countries to have a positive relationship. 
 
The sanctions after the Tiananmen massacre were quickly overcome by the Chinese. China became 
an important source of cheap labor and imports. Therefore, the international community did not fret 
long about the Chinese human right abuses, as the country had become too important in the 
international game. Clinton also pushed his worries aside, as the expansion of the US economy was 
his first priority (Ibid: 263). 
In 1999, NATO accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which entailed three 
killings (Ibid: 261). It generated a conflict between China and the United States, as the former 
rejected the latter’s explanations (the United States claimed, that it wasn’t on purpose, and the 
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intention was to bomb something nearby). Consequently, the American embassy in Beijing was 
besieged by demonstrators, who sat fire to the home of the American consul general (Ibid). 
At the American presidential campaign in 1999, the Chinese were therefore very antagonistic 
towards American values. 
 
But China’s position as a rising great power was obvious for everybody. Early in the twenty-first 
century, China had become the world’s third largest economy and the third largest trading economy 
in the world (Cohen 2009: 264). In 2002, the country held 118 billion $ in the US treasury. In 2008, 
it was almost multiplied by six, reaching 727.4 billion $ (Table 6 see appendix). 
Progress was made in a very short time period. The economic boom allowed the country to invest 
and expand their military force, while their Japanese neighbor’s economy stagnated. A power shift 
in Asia was taking place. 
In January 2001, George Bush stepped into the White House as the 43
rd
 president of the United 
States of America (The White House.com). Opposite to what his predecessors claimed, he labeled 
China a “strategic competitor” instead of a “strategic partner” (Bader 2012: 20). 
At April 1
st
 2001, a plane collision occurs when a Chinese plane, which goes into the sea, and an 
American plane, which makes an emergency landing on Chinese territory (Cohen 2009: 267). The 
Chinese government decided to detain the crew and the American plane, until an American apology 
was made. At first, President Bush tried to intimidate China, but ended expressing regrets for the 
loss of the Chinese pilot, whose body was never found. China came out of this dispute as 
“winners”, as they didn’t give in. They were too strong, important and proud to be ignored, and now 
had the power to withstand the United States on some issues. But this episode characterized their 
relationship, which had been very unstable and tense, especially since the NATO accident in 1999, 
which had also been marked by several other small conflicts. 
Nevertheless, this confirmed China’s status as a new major power, which was underpinned by the 
awarding of the summer Olympics in 2008. The country returned to “greatness” (Cohen 2009: 268). 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks abruptly shifted the American focus away from China and the war on 
terror was now an important part of the American foreign policy. The US attacks on Taliban and 
Bin Laden in Afghanistan, were immediately approved by Jiang, the Chinese president, who was 
even invited to Bush’s ranch in Texas, October 2002 (Cohen 2009: 269). This was clearly a wish to 
show the outside world the good relationship between its leaders, and was definitely a step forward 
in their relationship. 
 Page 38 of 96 
 
 
In 2003, Hu-Jintao became the president of the People’s Republic of China, and was determined to 
continue its predecessor’s policy towards the US (Cohen 2009: 271). It was clear for him and Bush 
that their economies were intertwined, and that it had an enormous strategic and economic value to 
maintain good relations. In the year of 2000, the US exports to China were 16.3 billion $, while 
their imports reached 100.1 billion $. This was a clear sign that they were getting increasingly 
dependent on each other: the United States needed the cheap Chinese goods, and the Chinese 
needed the United States’ investments, which helped them continue their incredible development. 
The United States trade balance deficit was now -83.8 billion $ (Table 1 see appendix). Hence, it 
was important for both sides to maintain some level of cooperation. 
On the political level, the relationship increased as a result of the Chinese support in the war against 
terror, but also in resolving other international problems, i.e. North Korea. This led Bush to claim 
in 2006, that the Sino-American was “the best ever” (Cohen 2009: 276). 
 
By 2007, China contributed more to the world’s economic growth than any other nation, and thus 
became a competitor on energy and raw material resources (Cohen 2009: 264). Furthermore, China 
was the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. 
As Warren Cohen puts it in America’s response to China: A History of Sino-American relations, the 
nature of the Sino-American relationship through time has been “Schizophrenic” (Cohen 2009: 
278): very volatile, characterized by highs and lows for the last decades. 
 
The American perception of China in the 21
st
 century 
Many prominent Americans did state that policies of engaging China had been a huge success, 
calling for greater efforts for an integration of China in the international community, and thus 
abandoning the idea of constraining China (Cohen 2009:281). The US population began to see 
China as an important ally, rather than an enemy and a competitor, although there still was 
uneasiness about China’s opaque military spending program. The one issue that could not be 
resolved was human rights. 
 
Today, two major issues are still dividing China and the United States: Americans have a hard time 
gaining trust to a communist authoritarian regime, denying democratic values. The other one is the 
Taiwanese question, which will be broached in the next paragraph (Cohen 2009: 287). 
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It is clear that the Sino-American power balance has begun tipping towards China over the last 
decade: the Chinese economy has boomed at a phenomenal speed, while the US economy stagnated 
during the financial crisis, causing a recession. China has been less exposed, as practicing state 
capitalism (Ibid: 288-289). 
 
The American influence in the world peaked after the Cold War in the late 90’s. In 2008, 
international polls showed that the US was less popular than China, and seen as a greater threat to 
the world (Cohen 2009: 289). 
In 2009, the United States was the leading debtor nation in the world, borrowing money from 
China, who was the largest creditor nation (Ibid). That very same year, China surpassed its 
American counterpart as the most emitting country of greenhouse gases (Bader 2012: 21). 
The increasing cooperation can be emphasized by looking at the import/exports between China and 
the United States. In 2010, the US exports to China were worth 91.9 billion $, whereas their imports 
were worth 364.9 billion $. The US trade balance was -273.1 billion $, whereas it, as mentioned 
earlier, was + 2.7 billion $ in 1980. This shows that during the period from 1980 to 2010, the trade 
balance has differentiated with a value of 275.8 billion $ (Table 1 see appendix). In 2012, China 
was the country earning the most from the US in 2012, which underpins an increased dependence 
between the two countries (Figure 2.Trading balances with selected trading partners: 2012). 
 
The American leaders are consequently forced to consider their positions towards several issues, 
according to the Chinese. They have decreasing leverage with the Chinese leaders, and have to 
focus on common interests (nuclear proliferation, environmental problems, fighting criminality, 
terrorism etc.) (Cohen 2009: 290). Nonetheless, China has to live in an American created 
international system, which made it increasingly powerful and influential. They benefit a lot from 
the US being the hegemon, as they can stand in the shadow of the Americans. America’s 
responsibility in ensuring stability in several regions (e.g. the Middle East) somehow makes China 
dependent on them, as they heavily rely on natural resources and energy: 
 
“And what the Chinese leaders are very focused on as number one, is to tackle a lot of the domestic 
issues that they are facing. And they are facing an enormous amount of domestic challenges, that 
are huge challenges”, stresses Camilla Sørensen (Sørensen: 24.17-28.59). 
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As abovementioned, China still faces numerous challenges on the domestic level, in spite of its 
explosive development. It is a poor country, lacking women consequently to their one child policy, 
having an aging population and a very unequal distribution (Cohen 2009: 291). According to the 
CIA Factbook, the United States had a GINI index of 45.0 in 2007, whereas China’s was 47.4 in 
2012 (CIA.gov). But a study from December 2012 shows that the reality is much worse, as the 
actual GINI index being 61.0 (Economist.com a). 
In addition to that, pollution and corruption are a plague in the country. On the domestic policy 
level, the United States are still decades ahead of China (Sørensen: 24.17-28.59). 
 
To sum up, the relationship between China and the United States has changed a lot over the three 
last decades. It has been shaped by the international system and order (the Cold war), and the 
existing hierarchy between nations. Several minor conflicts have influenced their relation, 
constituted of numerous highs and lows. In the early 80’s, the United States clearly was a more 
important and powerful actor than their Asian counterpart, both on the economic, military and 
influential level. But with time, things have evolved, emphasizing China’s importance in the 
contemporary world. The economic cooperation between them has enhanced China’s development, 
intertwining the two countries’ economies, although there still remain disagreements on various 
essential issues that potentially could lead to a military conflict. 
 
4.1.2 Taiwan’s historical relationship with China and the US 
Since Kuomintang
2
 retreated to Taiwan after being defeated in the Chinese civil war in 1949, 
Taiwan has been an issue of tense relation between the US and China. The US acknowledged 
Taiwan as an ally and recognized Kuomintang as the legitimate rulers of China. This changed in 
1979 with the recognition of People’s Republic of China and since the US and Taiwan has only had 
informal relations and their relationship can be said to have a great deal of complexity.  
From a Chinese point of view, Taiwan is “the one that got away”. It is still regarded as a part of 
China and an “internal affair”, as the two territories has been inalienable historically. Consequently, 
it has entailed tense relations for a long time, as the Taiwan issue is related to Chinese state 
sovereignty. 
                                                 
2
 Kuomintang was one of the Chinese political parties, and lost the civil war to Chinese Communist Party. Since its 
retreat to Taiwan in 1949, it had maintained its position as a single-ruling party in Taiwan. Taiwan is no longer a single-
party state after its 1987 reform, but the KMT still remains as one of the main political parties. 
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The US-Taiwan-China relations are very complex, as the states’ policies have been affecting the 
policies of the others.  
In order to understand the triangular relationship of the US-Taiwan-China, it is important to 
understand how China and the US perceive Taiwan. 
The acknowledgement of China in 79’ changed the US relations towards Taiwan, as mentioned in 
the previous section. In general, the US position can be said to have had a character of “strategic 
ambiguity” in relation to Taiwan (Time.com). The shift from acknowledgement of the government 
in Taipei to Beijing, and the agreements the US signed in the wake of that, showed the 
contradictory aspect of the US relations towards Taiwan. On one hand, the United States 
acknowledged the “one China” policy, but on the other hand they signed the Taiwan Relations Act, 
which included supplying Taiwan with enough weapons to make them able to defend themselves in 
case of a military threat. It also included the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan, 
acting as a de facto embassy. According to the Relations Act, threats toward Taiwan are “a big 
concern to the United states” (Tucker 1998-99: 161-62).  
The signing of the Taiwan Relations Act was seen as a provocation by China, claiming on several 
occasions that it is hampering the Sino-US relations, and stressing that Taiwan is the “most crucial 
and sensitive issue” between them and the US (Armscontrol.org ; China daily.com a;  People’s 
daily online.com). One of the major issues regarding the Taiwan Relation Act is the continuance of 
US sales of arms to Taiwan. The quality and the quantities of the arm sales have varied, although 
the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
3
 has been violated by several 
American presidents (George Bush Sr., Jr. & Obama). The Chinese government tried to handle this 
problem through the August 17 Communiqué, where the US agreed that “its arms sales to Taiwan 
will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms … it intends gradually to reduce its 
sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution” 
(Taiwandocuments.org). As shown in Table 1 (see appendix), it seemed that the US steadily 
decreased its arms sales to Taiwan. However, this would later turn out to be a temporary reaction. 
Numerous tensions in the Sino-American relationship have resulted from this issue. This will be 
further touch upon in section 5.1.2 and 6. 
 
                                                 
3
 U.S. – PRC Joint Communique on Arms sales (1982 Communique) in which US acknowledge:” … that it does not seek 
to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in 
qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, 
leading over a period of time to a final resolution.” 
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As China considers Taiwan a domestic issue, the former’s conception is that no other state should 
interfere in policy. This is an important point in understanding the tension Taiwan can create in the 
Sino-American relationship. Their view on Taiwan is underlined by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People’s Republic of China. It is stated very clearly on their web page: 
 
“The Taiwan question is a question left over by the civil war in China, and it is purely China’s 
internal affair … The Taiwan question is a question of safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity defending national honor and opposing external interference by the Chinese Government 
and people” (Fmprc.gov.cn) 
For China, the fundamental solution of the question of Taiwan is reunification. China has been 
adhering to the principle of ‘One China’ since it was authorized internationally in 1971, suggesting 
the unification of China and Taiwan, and grasping the PRC as the sole legitimate government of 
China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China clarifies this argument by 
stating that: 
 
“The Chinese Government and people adhere to the principle of One China, resolutely oppose all 
schemes aimed at splitting the country and the nation, and resolutely oppose any attempts of 
creating ‘two chinas’, ‘one china and one Taiwan’, or ‘Taiwan independence’” (Ibid) 
 
Taiwan’s development 
In understanding the US-Taiwan-China relationship, the development of several domestic affairs of 
Taiwan is of significant influence. Two of the most important factors of development in Taiwan 
have been the economic growth and the development of a democratic regime. The growth in the 
Taiwanese economy started in the early 1950’s, shortly after the communists had won the civil war 
in China and the old government fled and established itself on the island of Taiwan (Tien & Shiau 
1992: 59).  
From 1954-90 Taiwan experienced a growth rate of almost 9 % of annual GDP (Ibid) and their 
trade with the US grew very quickly. The growth was mainly based on manufacturing and exporting 
goods, and Taiwan became termed as a part of the Four Asian Tigers along with Singapore, Hong 
Kong and South Korea, due to their big economic growth (Investopedia.com). As an example, the 
goods trade export to the US was 4.3 billion $ in 1980, which increased to 11.5 billion $ in 1990 
and even further to 24.4 in the year 2000 (United States Trade Representatives.com) The 
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development of the economic relations between the US and Taiwan meant that by 1997, Taiwan 
was the US’ 7th biggest trading partner (Tucker 1998-99: 153). In the last decades, the US trade and 
investments in the region have increasingly been targeting China instead of Taiwan. Taiwan is now 
the 12th biggest trading partner for the US and their trade relations seems to be decreasing. Between 
2011 and 2012, the US had an increase of import and export with China of respectively 6.6 % and 
6.2 % whereas it was -6.2 and -5.9 % in relation to Taiwan.  As a result of this development, the 
economic relations with Taiwan are now of less importance, as a bigger share of trade and 
investments are going to China.  
 
But, the economic cooperation between China and Taiwan has increased instead. In 1991, the Sino-
Taiwanese trade had a value of 8 billion $, which increased to 39 billion $ in 2002 (Morrison 2003: 
4). China has also become Taiwan’s biggest trading partner, while Taiwan is among China’s 10 
biggest (Cfr.org).  
As shown in Table 3 (see appendix) and Table 4 (see appendix), trade and investment between the 
two countries have steadily increased since the 90’s.  Many big Taiwanese companies on the 
mainland are a big part of China’s trade. According to the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China, 12.6% of the biggest companies on mainland were Taiwanese in 2005, and their 
total trade share was 9.5% of China’s total trade (Roc-Taiwan.org).  
 
Following the economic development, the then president Chiang Ching-Kuo reformed the 
authoritarian regime of Taiwan by legalizing different political parties and thereby starting the 
process of democratizing Taiwan (Tien & Shiau 1992: 59). The democratization of Taiwan and its 
growing economic relations with the US have been two essential factors for US policymakers in 
their relations to Taiwan. This was exemplified by Peter W. Rodman in 2004, then Assistant 
Secretary for International security Affairs in the US department of Defense: “Taiwan’s evolution 
into a true multi-party democracy over the past decade proof of the importance of American 
commitment to Taiwan’s defense” (Hickey & Zhou 2010: 152).   
This statement is underpinned by Camilla Sørensen. She states that there is a feeling of 
responsibility in the US to support a small democracy like Taiwan: “ … it would be very difficult 
for the US to not support Taiwan in the case of a conflict, or simply not continuing to supporting 
Taiwan’s ability to protect or defend itself” (Sørensen: 11.06-13.07). 
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As elaborated, the economic and democratic development of Taiwan has transformed the island into 
an economic and ideological partner for the US. 
 
The Taiwan Strait Crisis 
During the last three decades, the Taiwan Strait Crisis was undoubtedly the closest the US and 
China came to a military conflict. This crisis occurred as a result of the US allowing the then 
president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-Hui, to attend a reunion at Cornell University in 1995. This was the 
first time since the Great Aberration that a Taiwanese leader was allowed to attend in any official 
events on US soil or with US officials. This was seen as a massive provocation by the Chinese and 
as a symbol of support for Taiwan’s independence from the US (Ross 2000: 1). The latter was, in 
the eyes of the Chinese, also supported by the fact that the US had violated the 1982 agreement.  
 
Following President Lee Teng-Hui’s visit to the USA, China started to do military exercises close 
to Taiwan and started deploying forces from other parts of China to the coastal area close to 
Taiwan. In early March 1996, a missile test was made only 30 miles from the Taiwanese coast, 
which was at danger for ships and aircrafts coming into Taiwan’s ports. This resulted in the US 
sending warships and planes to station on the Eastern part of Taiwan, showing US determination to 
keep peace in the region (Global security.org)  It never resulted in any direct confrontation, but 
showed the obvious tension that the Taiwan issue can create. 
Following the crisis in 96’, the Sino-American relations improved throughout the rest of the Clinton 
administration, and the policy focusing on Taiwan’s protection shifted towards a more pro-China 
policy (Haenle 2012: 3). 
 
Policies during the Bush Jr. administration 
The election of George Bush Jr. as president in the year 2000 meant a shift in a more pro-Taiwanese 
direction. This was clearly shown on April 2001, when Bush publicly stated that the US would do: 
“… Whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself” from a potential Chinese attack (deLisle 2011: 
1). Their improved relations were shown by the defense minister of Taiwan meeting unofficially 
with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in early 2002, in what was the highest-level 
meeting between US and Taiwan officials since 78’ (Carpenter 2004: 3). This led to increasing 
frictions in the Sino-American relationship, but Bush’s pro-Taiwan policy somewhat changed after 
9/11 with the war on terror, and the Chinese support of that policy. 
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Jacques deLisle, Director of the FPRI’s Asia program and professor of political science at 
Pensylvania University, argues that the change in the Bush administration’s policy towards Taiwan 
is related to the growing need for support in international politics. This meant, according to deLisle, 
that: “As the U.S. pursued China’s backing or at least acquiescence, it reduced the emphasis in its 
China policy on issues that brought friction with Beijing” (deLisle 2011: 2).  
Bush’s change towards a more pro-Chinese policy was highly affected by the then president of 
Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian, who was very provocative towards China and tried to promote 
independence.  
 
Under Chen Shui-Bian, Taiwan kept emphasizing its sovereignty and independence, giving rise to a 
strong Chinese oppression towards Taiwan in order to make even the attempt difficult.  
In 2005, President Hu Jintao passed the ‘Anti-Secession Law’ as a response to Taiwan’s 
provocative attitude. This law implied that China could use “non-peaceful means” to hinder 
Taiwan’s independence. (Ibid: 58-59). 
This led to increasing tension between Taiwan and China, but also negatively affected the US-
Taiwan relationship because Chen Shui-Bian “tried to do a lot of things that would risk the stability 
in the Taiwan Strait” (Sørensen: 14.52-18.16), seen from a US perspective.  
As the war on terror continued, the Sino-American relationship developed and kick-started 
cooperation on a long range of political issues. This included Bush and Hu Jintao opening a military 
red-line between the two countries. This development (among others) led then US Deputy Secretary 
of State, Robert Zoellick, to note that the US and China were now “responsible stakeholders” in 
international affairs (Zhiyue 2010: 256-57). 
During Obama’s early years in office, US policies continued in the track of Bush’s post-9/11 policy, 
focusing on cooperation with China, while trying to ignore the Taiwan problem in the Sino-
American relations (Ibid: 262). The focus on improving terms with China was, by many observers, 
seen as the main reason behind Obama’s major scale down in the planned arm sales to Taiwan in 
2011 (The new American.com). Since the launch of the “pivot to Asia” in 2012, there have, 
however, been indications that security in the Asian region is of increasing importance in US 
policies. Taiwan was never directly mentioned in the pivot, but several experts point out the fact 
that the island has somewhat regained some kind of importance in an American perspective. This is 
furthermore shown in the US-Taiwan agreement on arm sales in 2013 and 2015, which will make 
Obama the first president ever to sell arms more than once during a presidential term (China.org). 
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China has continuously demanded that the US act upon the official agreement, which includes the 
willingness of the US to reduce weapon sales. However, the US has continued to sell weaponry to 
Taiwan, neglecting China thoroughly, and thereby damaging the Sino-American relations. 
 
Under the Obama administration, the US is still exporting huge amounts of weaponry to Taiwan. In 
2010, the United States sold about 6,400 million $ of arms to Taiwan, including Black Hawk utility 
helicopters and PAC-3 missile defense missiles. Subsequently, about 5,900 million $ of arms, 
including Retrofit F-16A/B fighters, were sold in 2011 (Kan 2013: 58). This could indicate that 
there isn’t any change in the American position on weapons sales to Taiwan, as being inevitable for 
the security of the Taiwan-Strait. 
During the last couple of years, one can observe, however, a change in China’s reactions to arms 
sales to Taiwan. In the past, the Chinese response was often limited to declaring its opposition, 
whereas China nowadays takes some visible actions toward the US. For instance, China banned all 
military and security contacts with Washington, when the Obama administration announced its 
scheme to sell arms to Taiwan. In addition, they threatened relevant US firms to impose sanctions. 
Ma Zhaoxu, foreign ministry spokesman of People’s Republic of China claims: 
 
“China-US relations, in important international and regional issues, will inevitably be influenced 
and the responsibility completely lies with the United States … We strongly urge relevant US 
companies to stop pushing forward and taking part in the arms sales to Taiwan” (Agency France 
Presse.com) 
 
As it becomes inevitable for the US to cooperate with China in order to handle global issues, China 
seems to use that fact efficiently. China emphasizes its position as a strategic partner with the US in 
the international system, and calls upon the US to act within the spheres where two countries can 
compromise. This could be an indication that China may show a more active attitude towards 
Taiwan.  
 
China – Taiwan agreement on trade 
The notable thing today is that the pendulum is leaning towards cooperation rather than 
confrontation since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. The Ma Ying-jeou administration 
prioritized the prosperity of China-Taiwan relations, enhancing a focus on cooperation, setting aside 
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their conflictive sovereignty position for a while. Especially, the Ma Ying-jeou administration tried 
to deepen and expand economic cooperation through high-level talks since 2008. At the fifth high-
level talk in 2010, both parts agreed to conclude Economic Cooperation Framework Association 
(ECFA
4
). What we have to focus on with the ECFA is that it was concluded because that both 
countries’ strategic policy were matched simultaneously, respectively Taiwan’s pursuit of its 
economic progress and China’s ambition to expand its influence over Taiwan (Ki-Sik 2011 : 81). It 
seems that there was no other possible solution for Taiwan.  
At that time, the new trade bloc, ASEAN+1
5
, was waiting to be launched, which would degrade the 
competitive power of Taiwanese goods by excluding Taiwan from the customs union. Furthermore, 
ASEAN+1 had already finished its setting to add Japan and South Korea. Taiwan was facing a 
crisis of “being marginalized in an emerging trade zone in Asia”. That’s why a ruling Kuomintang 
think tank said that the ECFA “cannot wait a single day” and had to be signed as quickly as possible 
(Chen 2009 : 2-3).  
However, there seems to be a further aim for China. Li Fei, deputy director of the Taiwan Research 
Center at Xiamen University, stresses that China is looking forward to three major benefits through 
the ECFA, strengthening its economic power, stabilizing cross-strait relations, and finally pushing 
forward peaceful reunification through economic integration (Ibid : 5). China did not – and will not 
- change its ultimate goal: reunification with Taiwan. Instead, it seems that China is trying to handle 
the Taiwan issue on a longer term, indirectly and peacefully. This is also evident when Camilla 
Sørensen states that: 
 
“… the general feeling in China is that time is on Chinas side and also because of the economic 
relationship is so strong and of course there is a dependency for Taiwanese economy for good 
relations with China’s economy (…) things are moving in the right direction” (Sørensen: 14.52-
18.16) 
 
China made a lot of concessions within ECFA, which was concluded in a favor of Taiwan, 
particularly in goods and service sector.  
                                                 
4
 ECFA is an agreement which sets institutional frame of economic cooperation, partly liberalizing 
both countries’ markets (Ki-Sik 2011 : 81) 
5
 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, South Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, and the “1” indicates China. 
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Actually, the result brought by ECFA shows that it was far more advantageous for Taiwan. In 2010, 
Taiwan’s economic growth rate was 10.82%, which is distinctive compared to -2.14% in 2008 and  
-1.87% in 2009 (Ki-sik 2011: 88). 
 
The Sino-Taiwanese relationship has very strong economic relations, but none in regards to military 
cooperation. The US-Taiwan relations are nowadays very strong in the military aspect, whereas 
there has been a decrease on the economic issues (see figure).Their economic relations remain 
relatively strong though. 
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5.0 Analysis: Two theoretical views on the Sino-American relationship 
 
In this chapter, we will take a look at how the Sino-American relationship, regarding Taiwan, can 
be interpreted by the two theoretical approaches. The structure of this chapter is based on the 
division of both theories into concepts, except from the perception on change concept, as explained 
in the analytical strategy. To begin with, we analyze the nature of the relationship through offensive 
realism. After that, we use a similar approach regarding complex interdependence. 
This chapter deals with how the US and China act towards Taiwan through three of the main 
concepts related to the theories: interest, economy and military. In order to do that, we exemplify 
how the two theories can explain some of the past actions and policies of US and China regarding 
Taiwan, shown in section 4. The analysis only deals with how the actions of the US and China can 
be seen through the lenses of the theories, and not where the theories can’t explain their actions. 
This will be discussed in section 6. At the end of the chapter, we will sum up the main points that 
have been put forward throughout the analysis.   
 
5.1 Offensive realism regarding Sino-American relations 
This section will deal with how Chinese and US actions toward Taiwan can be analyzed through 
offensive realism. As stated above, it will deal with the concepts of interest, economy and military. 
Each of these concepts includes both US and China’s perspectives on these concepts. 
 
5.1.1 Interest 
When we want to understand some particular behavior of a state, we need to look at what interest 
that state has. States will behave in different directions depending on what interest they pursue. The 
basic premise of Mearsheimer’s theory is that all states’ ultimate goal is to survive, and therefore 
the notion of security is of big importance. To improve chances of survival, the overall aim for all 
great powers is to become a regional hegemon. As the US is already in the position of the world’s 
only regional hegemon, their aim will be to keep the status quo. The maintenance of Taiwan, as a de 
facto state, would therefore be important for the US in preventing China from increasing their 
power, and thereby threatening this position. The opposite can therefore also be said to be the case 
for China. With regards to the US, the issue of security is related to the fact that they are in the 
position of being the only regional hegemon. They therefore have a power no other state can match 
and thereby has a high level of security. But, as Mearsheimer states: 
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“Regional hegemons attempts to check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that a 
rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially 
free to cause trouble in the fearful great power’s backyard” (Mearsheimer 2004: 186). 
 
You can argue that in order to maintain US security, they would have to balance out the power of 
China as an aspiring regional hegemon. In line with the argument of offensive realism, they would 
have to balance out the power of China. As no other Asian state can counter the power of China, 
one can say that US military support and presence in many Asian countries is a way of doing that. 
The US policy towards Taiwan can be seen in the same way. In order to avoid China’s power 
increasing even further, the US needs to keep Taiwan out of Chinese control. In the view of 
Mearsheimer, this can be said to have been the case in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis (see section 4). 
As the Chinese showed signs of aggression towards Taiwan, the US sent military to the Taiwan 
Strait to protect Taiwan. This is in line with the theory, as it claims that the US, as the only regional 
hegemon, could not leave matters to be dealt with by the other great powers in the Asian region. As 
they in this case seemed unable to contain China, the US had to do what was necessary in order to 
prevent China’s aggressive behavior (Mearsheimer 2004: 186). As the theory of offensive realism 
claims that the US, as the only regional hegemon, will prefer to stay out of other regions as long as 
no great power emerges as a threat to the US. This could also be said to be an argument for the 
continuance of arm sales from the US to Taiwan, despite the fact that US signed a treaty with China 
to cut down on the sales (Communique 1982, see section 4). One could argue that the continuing 
sale of arms is done in order to keep the military balance between Taiwan and China, and thereby 
preventing China from reunification with Taiwan. 
 
Just opposite, China is increasing its influence, not only in economy, but also in security. Therefore, 
reunification with Taiwan can be said to be part of the overall interest of China, as this will lead to 
increased power and a better chance of becoming a regional hegemon. In Mearsheimer’s view, 
reunification with Taiwan can also be said to be of big importance, because “national unification is 
another goal that usually complements the pursuit of power” (Mearsheimer 2004: 190). Therefore, 
a reunification would make China’s power rise. This is also based on the fact that Taiwan is of 
significant importance in terms of strategic military positioning in the region (see section 4). 
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A recent US policy under the Obama administration has been the Pivot to Asia from 2011 which is 
now referred to as the “The rebalancing policy” (Copper 2013: 2, section 4). This pivot has seen the 
US increase their military focus to Asia and has led to an increase in official meetings with several 
Asian leaders. Even though Taiwan is not directly mentioned in the pivot, recent developments 
would suggest that they are very much a part of the rebalancing plan. There have been several high 
level meetings, including Taiwanese president Ma meeting New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg. 
One can argue that this, along with the continuing and increase in sale of arms, suggest that Taiwan 
is still important to the US. Professor of International Studies at Rhodes University in Memphis, 
John F. Copper, points out that the focus on rebalancing in Asia is very much a result of a US 
acknowledgement of US needing to contain China’s rise (Ibid). This is very much in line with the 
earlier quote from Mearsheimer, and shows that some of the recent developments in the US policies 
towards Taiwan can be said to fit with the perspective of offensive realism.  
 
Also in line with offensive realism, the ‘balancing’ policy that the US is implementing in Asia, is 
what the world’s only regional hegemon would do in order to contain a potential rising great power. 
Simultaneously, China’s modernization of their military is also correspondent with how 
Mearsheimer predicts a rising great power will act. As shown in figure 3, the Chinese spending on 
military has increased significantly. Mearsheimer has in another paper called, China’s challenge to 
US power in Asia, claimed that China will seek to: “… make sure that it is so powerful that no other 
state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it” (Mearsheimer 2010: 389). In his view, China’s 
investment in military is thus based on a wish to become more powerful in a pursuit to become the 
regional hegemon in Asia. Additionally, he states that he expects China to adopt a more critical 
position towards US involvement in the region, and pursue a policy where they will try to “dictate 
the boundaries of acceptable behavior” for the neighboring countries (Ibid). The former can be said 
to be the case, as China is increasingly critical of US involvement in e.g. Taiwan. This was shown 
in section 4, where they have taken direct actions and suspended some military relations as 
consequence of US arms sales to Taiwan (China-embassy.org). In relation to the latter, the recent 
conflicts with e.g. Japan, Vietnam and South Korea in the last few years over territory in the South 
and East China Sea shows how China is increasing their active actions in regards to other states 
(Economist.com b). This has also been the case in relation to Taiwan, as China in 2005 passed the 
“anti-secessions law” (see section 4), which underlines that by threatening with their military 
power, China tries to dictate the boundaries of Taiwan’s behavior. 
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5.1.2 Military 
With regards to our concept of military power, it can be said that in the view of Mearsheimer, China 
and the US fit rather well on his idea of potential and actual power. As described in section 3, 
Mearsheimer states that a potential power is a state that has a large population and wealth. As 
Mearsheimer states: 
 
“But great powers also pay careful attention to how much latent power rival states control, because 
rich and populous states usually can and do build powerful armies. Thus, great powers tend to fear 
states with large populations and rapidly expanding economies, even if these states have not yet 
translated their wealth into military might.” (Mearsheimer 2004: 190) 
 
In this perspective, this can be said to fit very well with the Sino-American relationship. China can 
be said to fit well with the description of the latter parts of the quote. With a large population of 
more than 1.3 billion people and an average GDP growth of almost 10 % a year for several decades, 
China can be said to fulfill the requirements for a potential power Worldpopulationreview.com; 
Worldbank.org). The US has by far the most powerful military capabilities and thus can be 
characterized as an actual power that pays attention to China (Military1.com). Furthermore, China 
is increasing their investments in their military and have become the world’s second largest investor 
in military (Ibid), and one can therefore argue that China perhaps is already on their way to translate 
their wealth into military might.  
As stated in section 3, Mearsheimer mentions three reasons for fear between states. In this analysis, 
we will only include the two last reasons: the fact that states always have some military capabilities, 
and uncertainty of the other states’ intentions. In the case of the US, the fear can therefore be said to 
be related to the fact that, despite China’s level of military cannot match the level of the US, they 
still have large military capabilities. On top of that, their military modernization means that they are 
only going to become more powerful. Along with the uncertainty about China’s intentions, the US 
fear can be said to be present. The uncertainty about China’s intentions is clearly evident in the US, 
as many politicians and scholars point out that there is a great deal of uncertainty, and stresses the 
importance of China to clearly state their intentions. This was pointed out in 2005 by Robert 
Zoellick, when he stated: “Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United 
States -- and others as well -- to hedge relations with China” (Washingtonpost.com). And it seems 
the uncertainty is continuing. This was recently becoming more concrete, as China created an “air 
defense identification zone” in the East China Sea. This again led to a US administration official to 
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say that US had:”… concerns with this move by the Chinese because it raises serious questions 
about their intentions” (Theepochtimes.com).  
 
The same can also be said to be the case for China. There is an increasing worry in China about 
whether the US will let them rise. This has been helped recently by the US pivot to Asia, which has 
resulted in worries in China about US intensions. Generally, there has been some Chinese 
uncertainty towards US intensions. This is underlined by Camilla Sørensen when she says that: “… 
China fears that the US will never allow a strong China and try to contain China” (Sørensen: 28:59 
- 31.17). It’s claimed by some that the military modernization in China is related to the uncertainty 
about US intentions (Peopledaily.com.cn). 
If following Mearsheimer’s line of arguments, the increasing fear in the Sino-US relations would 
result in a higher security competition and a higher risk of armed conflict (section 3). If we relate it 
to their actions towards Taiwan, one can argue that there is to some degree an increase in security 
competition, as the US has increased their sale of arms and in general turned up their military 
cooperation with many countries in the region. China has likewise increased their military 
capabilities, especially along the coast of the Taiwan Strait, signaling that they will not by any 
means pull out of security competition.  
 
5.1.2 Economy 
As it was shown in section 4, Taiwan is an important trading partner with the US, but is perhaps of 
even greater importance to other states in East Asia and thereby also for the potential power balance 
in the region. Firstly, it’s important to distinguish between the importance of Taiwan in pure US-
Taiwan relations, and the importance of Taiwan in relation to preventing China from becoming a 
regional hegemon. Both are important, but according to offensive realism, the latter one is more 
relevant, as the overall goal of the US is to keep the status quo. 
We will start though, by briefly accounting for the pure US-Taiwan relationship, just to underline 
that there are also purely economic relations between the two. As of 2013, Taiwan was the 12th 
biggest trading partner of America (Census.gov), and they had a total trade worth the value of 63 
billion $ a year. 
If we turn the focus to US sales of arms to Taiwan, it can of course still be said to be a case of US-
Taiwan trade, but one can also argue that it’s a matter of the US focusing more on relative gains 
than on absolute gains, which would be in line with Mearsheimer’s theory. That can be said to be 
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the case, as the US is aware that their arms sales to Taiwan is negatively affecting the Sino-US 
relationship. But the US has decided to stay strong on their arms sales, despite severe criticism from 
China, especially in the wake of Obama agreeing on one of the biggest arms sales to Taiwan since 
1979 (Chinadaily.com b). In the perspective of Mearsheimer, this can be said to be a result of the 
US preferring getting a smaller benefit from Sino-US relations, but simultaneously making sure 
China’s gains are smaller in i.e. power, due to Taiwan staying de facto independent. One can say 
this shows that US will be, as all states, according to Mearsheimer, focusing on relative gains. 
It is somewhat harder to emphasize whether China is focusing on relative gains as well. It’s hard to 
say whether China’s increasing relations with Taiwan is related to relative or absolute gains. This 
will therefore be touched upon in a more comprehensive discussion of the theory’s ability to explain 
the events in the discussion, section 6.   
 
5.2 Complex Interdependence on Sino-American relations 
In this section, we will look at how the Sino-American relations, regarding Taiwan, can be analyzed 
through the lens of complex interdependence. As mentioned earlier, we will deal with the concepts 
of interest, economy and military. Each of these concepts includes both US and Chinese 
perspectives on these concepts. 
 
5.2.1 Interest 
As we saw earlier, the theory of complex interdependence “expects” nations to act in a cooperative 
way, while avoiding military conflicts at the same time, and hopefully achieve mutual benefits. In 
this point of view, the US and China are expected to refrain from military use of force, and instead 
focus on economical and institutional instruments when faced with political obstacles. That means 
they will consider welfare issues to be more important than security issues, the opposite of the 
theory of Mearsheimer. The question of Taiwan is also expected to be dealt with in a peaceful way, 
even though this might be the main source of a potential conflict. 
Considering the three points characterizing complex interdependence, multiple channels connecting 
China, Taiwan and the US are expected. They create a connection between the societies through 
culture, trading and other interactions. The second characteristic, the lack of hierarchy among 
issues, is shown by the complex relationships the US has with both China and Taiwan. Officially, 
they support China’s ‘one China’ policy and their economies are getting increasingly intertwined, 
while at the same time promising to protect Taiwan from military interventions. The decrease of the 
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usefulness of military power, the third characteristic of complex interdependence, is also noticeable 
in the relationship between the three countries. Even though the question of Taiwan may be the 
source of a potential conflict between China and the US, both parties has historically preferred 
peaceful conflict resolution instead of engaging in a long and expensive war. According to the 
theory, the countries will also be more focused on increasing their wealth, than on the ‘high politics’ 
of security. Furthermore, China is also expected not to pursue the role of regional hegemon in Asia, 
since the notion of hegemony doesn’t play a relevant part in this theory. 
Despite this, a military conflict between the three nations is not unimaginable in the view of 
complex interdependence. As we saw earlier, there are still tensions among them that could escalate 
further in the future (see section 4). China will not accept any Taiwanese attempt to declare 
independence, while Taiwan will not accept any attempt from Beijing to control the island. 
Meanwhile, the US will not tolerate any interference in Taiwan’s democratic system from China, 
which is a stand they probably will uphold with military force, unless the Taiwanese provoke 
Beijing and create unnecessary tensions. Hickey and Zhou from Missouri State University elaborate 
on this point: 
 
“The three sides, however, each has its own political bottom-line that cannot be infringed upon. For 
Beijing, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. For the U.S., Taiwan’s feisty democracy must not 
be threatened by external forces, primarily the Chinese mainland. As for Taiwan, its absolute 
leadership over the island’s destiny and future association with the mainland cannot be impaired 
(…) Any miscommunication and/or misunderstanding could reignite tensions among the three.” 
(Gou and Gou 2010: 155-6) 
 
Despite acknowledging that military conflict is possible to occur, it’s not very likely in a complex 
interdependence perspective. According to this position, it’s not in the interest of either US nor 
China, as it will be affecting the economies negatively and reduces the possibility of fulfilling other, 
and more important, policy goals, i.e. increasing domestic welfare.  
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5.2.2 Military 
In the perspective of complex interdependence, as mentioned in chapter 5.2.1, military  actions are 
no longer a very effective policy as it’s often hurting the other policies of states i.e. welfare 
improvements. This is emphasized by Camilla Sørensen, when she stated that both US and China 
would like to avoid military conflict: 
 
 
“… I think on the overall level they have no interest, none of them, in military conflict (…) so both 
of them are really preoccupied with other issues, especially the US. And they know that conflict that 
will involve China and the US on each side would be a major conflict, and very difficult to contain 
within a region, or within in a system.” (Camilla Sørensen: 35.07-38.05) 
 
 
Her answer therefore fits well with the theory of complex interdependence.  
As mentioned earlier, China wants to reunite Taiwan with the rest of the country. According to the 
theory of complex interdependence, China would seek to find non-militaristic ways of reintegrating 
the two nations, since the military option has become less useful. So far China has not engaged 
Taiwan militarily, with the crisis of 96’ being the closest to such an encounter. On the contrary, 
China has opened up for cooperation with Taiwan since the 1980’s, especially in trading, which fits 
nicely with this particular theory. This has especially gathered speed since Ma Ying- jeou became 
president in 2008. Furthermore, his administration has valued cooperation with the Chinese 
government rather than focusing on the dividing subject of independence. But if Taipei one day 
should decide to pursue independence, China can use their economic power to stop the Taiwanese 
from separating entirely, since the island is so dependent on trading with the mainland: 
 
 
“economic tools such as economic sanctions might offer Beijing another chance (in addition to 
military means) to express its firm attitude in holding back Taiwan independence movement 
regardless of any economic costs, thus alleviating the likelihood of military conflicts sparked by 
Taiwan’s underestimating Beijing’s true resolve in restraining provocative actions.” (Gou and Gou 
2010:150) 
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When talking about US foreign policy regarding Taiwan, the US, despite a seemingly good 
relationship, appears to have their limits in the actual protection of the island. The terms of the 
American agreement to help Taiwan, in case of an act of aggression from mainland China, depend 
on the Taiwanese not creating “unnecessary tensions” with their northern neighbor. An agreement 
formulated like that can, imaginably in the ears of many in the Taiwanese population, sound like an 
American excuse to back off from their deal. Some may fear that if China uses force against 
Taiwan, and the US will gain more from refraining from interference, the Americans will consider 
blaming Taiwan, in any case, for “creating unnecessary tensions”. This makes it rather difficult for 
Taiwan to declare independence, since they might not be sure on how the US will respond and if 
they can count on US support if needed. But, according to US officials, America is determined to 
protect the democratic island of Taiwan: 
 
 
“American officials recognize that Taiwan’s democracy is far from perfect. But the island’s 
democratization has stiffened America’s resolve to protect it. As Peter W. Rodman, then Assistant 
Secretary for International Security Affairs in the U.S. Department of Defense, explained in 2004, 
“Taiwan’s evolution into a true multi-party democracy over the past decade is proof of the 
importance of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense. It strengthens American resolve to see 
Taiwan’s democracy grow and prosper.” (Gou & Gou 2010: 152) 
 
 
This dedication to protect Taiwan is also shared by the current US president, Barack Obama (Gou 
& Gou 2010: 152).  
As mentioned earlier, the closest the US has come to start a war with China was during the crisis of 
96’, when the Americans deployed warships and planes to the coast of Taiwan to stabilize the 
region. This could have led to a military confrontation, but since it didn’t one could argue, using the 
theory of complex interdependence, that both parts wouldn’t waste their military resources when it 
could be avoided. As mentioned above, in these modern times of complex interdependence, 
instruments other than military force has become more useful to us, which this incident shows. 
Even though it could be argued that military power was used to scare off China from military 
actions against Taiwan, the military option was only used to a certain limit. Furthermore, as we 
have seen before, the theory doesn’t regard military force as useless, since it can be very useful if 
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the circumstances are extreme enough. It has only become less useful in modern times. As Hickey 
and Zhou argues: 
 
“it appears likely that long-term mutual engagement and cooperation will prevail over political 
containment, armed confrontation and military rivalry, although differences and problems will 
undoubtedly occur from time to time.” (Gou and Gou 2010:139) 
 
5.2.3 Economy 
The analysis of the Sino-American relationship during the last three decades, viewed through the 
lens of complex interdependence, begins with the US recognizing the PRC as the legitimate 
government in China. This event confirms the liberal notion of cooperation being a better option 
than rivalry, even though China was a communist country and therefore an ideological opponent, at 
least on paper, of the Western alliance of democratic and capitalist states. The two nations’ 
cooperation has continued over the past decades, despite ups and downs such as the US favoring of 
Japan as their main ally in Asia, China supplying weapons technology to US non-allies and the 
Tiananmen Square massacre. The fact that the US is continuing trading with China, even though 
they have had several disputes, is a very strong argument for complex interdependence, since the 
theory argues for collaboration for mutual benefits instead of competition. 
 
This tendency of the two countries’ focus on the development of their economies, instead of 
engaging in diplomatic disputes, fits very well with the view of complex interdependence. The 
focus on economic relations was seen again during the Clinton administration, where economic 
gains were favored, despite US concerns of Chinese violations of human rights (see section 4). This 
is, again, an example of cooperation, which seems to have been, in general, more important to both 
nations, not only for the sake of their economies, but also to avoid multiple diplomatic crises. Even 
though China’s economy kept growing, eventually becoming the second largest economy in the 
world, while gaining more international power and influence at the same time, the Sino-American 
relationship kept its collaborating nature. As Pei-Shan Kao, assistant professor at National Chiao-
Tung University, explains, the two countries have always solved their different disputes, including 
those involving Taiwan, in a peaceful way in the last couple of decades: 
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“In serious crises and incidents (…) the two countries did not use force to resolve the problems. 
Conversely, by means of bargaining and consultations, they resolved their disputes peacefully. 
Since the end of the Cold War, not only has peace been maintained in this relationship; the two 
countries have close and highly interdependent economic and trade relations.” (Gou & Gou 2010: 
100f) 
 
As the quote above indicates, one can say that the lack of past military conflicts fits well with the 
theory of complex interdependence, as it shows that war doesn’t seem to be a policy preferred in the 
Sino–American relationship. Regarding Taiwan, the US seems to have a good relationship with the 
Taiwanese government, because of the part played by the US in building democratic institutions in 
Taiwan, but also because of the influence of the Taiwanese lobby in Washington. As mentioned 
earlier, their relationship has been based on mutual benefits, including Taiwan’s strategic 
geopolitical position and the national interests of both countries. The Taiwanese democratization 
has also helped strengthen the bond between the two states, which undoubtedly has improved the 
will of the US to defend the island and secure the peace of a fellow democracy in the region. Again, 
this fits nicely with the theory of complex interdependence and with the general neoliberal notion of 
democracies as peaceful actors. Furthermore, according to Hickey and Zhou, the ROC (Republic of 
China, Taiwan) is an essential trading partner to the US: 
 
“Although only a fraction of the size of the Chinese mainland (which considers the island to be its 
smallest province), Taiwan is one of the world’s largest traders. As one of the America’s largest 
trading partners, the ROC is of unquestionable economic importance to Washington. The U.S. 
presently conducts more trading with Taiwan than it does with Australia, Italy or any other country 
in the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe or South America.” (Gou & Gou 2010: 152) 
 
However, during the last few decades, Taiwan’s importance for the US economy has been 
diminishing a bit, as US trade and investments has increasingly been going to mainland China (see 
section 4). Therefore, Taiwan still has some economic importance to the US, as the quote shows, 
but it’s increasingly less important compared to China’s role for the US economy. Therefore, the 
US policy towards Taiwan doesn’t fit that well with the perspective of complex interdependence. 
Although the Americans have a cooperating relationship with the Chinese, including 
acknowledging China’s policy of a unified country, the US still has close ties with Taiwan. The US 
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signing of the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that America “will make available to Taiwan 
such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” (Gou & Gou 2010: 153), creates a paradox: the US 
recognition of China’s one country policy, while expressing concern for potential threats towards 
Taiwan at the same time. This has continuously hurt the Sino–American relations. This makes it 
difficult for the theory of complex interdependence to explain the actions of the US. If their goal is 
to reach the full potential of trading with China, which would maximize US welfare, then surely 
they would gain more by cutting the ties to Taiwan. Even if trading with the Taiwanese turned more 
profitable, it would still be nothing compared to the trade benefits of China. That is evident, as we 
saw in section 4, since the total sale of goods between the US and China had a value of 536 million 
$ in 2012, compared to 64.2 with Taiwan. Furthermore, as shown in the same chapter, there is an 
increasing tendency of economic relations with China and a decreasing one with Taiwan. Just 
between 2011 and 2012, the US had an increase of import and export respectively of 6.6 and 6.2 % 
whereas it was -6.2 and -5.9 % in relation to Taiwan (Trade.gov). Hickey and Zhou elaborate on the 
complexity of US relations to China when they state that: 
 
“Although friendly U.S.-China interactions are increasing steadily, America’s commitment to help 
Taiwan’s security, which was further promoted by Taiwan’s progress in democratization, remains 
steadfast.” (Gou & Gou 2010: 154) 
 
This shows that the theory of complex interdependence has some difficulties explaining US 
relations to Taiwan, mostly in the sales of arms. 
 
When looking at the China-Taiwan relationship, it is clear that they have increasingly intertwining 
economies. In the perspective of complex interdependence, this will keep any conflict from 
escalating. According to a US military report, a military conflict would have devastating 
consequences for both economies and it would “trigger domestic unrest on the mainland” (Gou 
and Gou 2010: 148). This is demonstrated by the fact that Taiwan’s total investment in mainland 
China rose from $17.1 billion in 2000 to $64.9 billion in 2007, while the mainland has become 
Taiwan’s biggest export market at the same time (Gou and Gou 2010: 148). 
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5.3 Summary 
Both the US and China strive to become regional hegemons, according to the theory of offensive 
realism. As the US is already in this position, they seek to keep a status quo. Their actions toward 
Taiwan can thus be seen in this perspective. This has been shown by the amount of weaponry the 
US has sold to Taiwan for defending themselves against military aggression from the mainland, and 
their general military presence in East Asia. China, on the other hand, is seeking to improve their 
power and gain more influence in the region. This is shown by their increasing military capabilities 
and active foreign policy. 
It is argued in section 5.1 that the US is an actual power in Mearsheimer’s perspective, while China 
is not yet one, but have big potential powers. US fear is also related to the uncertainty regarding 
China’s intentions. The reverse is also the case with China, as they fear that the US will not let them 
rise. 
Furthermore, US relations to Taiwan can be said to be related to a priority of relative gains. This is 
evident, as their arms sales negatively affect the Sino-American relationship, but is deprioritized as 
they focus on checking China. Offensive realism has difficulties explaining China’s economic 
relations to Taiwan. 
Looking at the relationships between the US, China and Taiwan, now using the theory of complex 
interdependence, it is clear that they are based and strongly influenced by their economies. As the 
theory of complex interdependence dictates, the three countries seem more interested in increasing 
their welfare and developing their economies. Because the economic factor is so important for the 
three different actors, the military option is regarded as a ‘last resort option’, since engaging in 
military conflict would affect all of them negatively. As Hickey and Zhou explains, their economic 
interdependence pushes them towards cooperation rather than conflict: 
 
“In short, one point is clear: economic considerations have gained an important position of 
influence with regard to the three actors’ political and security agendas. The rising trend of 
economic interdependence, wherein various interests become co-mingled, is projecting these 
relationships in the direction of mutual accommodation and cooperation.” (Gou and Gou 2010: 155) 
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6.0 Discussion 
This chapter is split into four parts. The first three parts is a discussion on how the different theories 
can explain the events covered previously in the project. We have decided to discuss the concepts in 
a different order, as we will finish the first three parts off with a discussion of the overall state 
interests. This is done as the discussion of states’ interests will work as a sort of meta-discussion, 
where the concepts of military and economy will also be drawn in to discuss how the two theories 
can supplement each other when explaining the events. This will give a clearer view of the Sino-
American relations. In the last part of the chapter, the results of this discussion will be used to test 
whether the hypothesis of China’s challenge to the hegemonic status of the US is correct. 
 
6.1 Military  
This section deals with a discussion about the military aspect of the Sino-American relationship, in 
relation to the two theories and the empirical data put forward previously in this project. First, the 
different views on the concept of military will be assessed. Afterwards, the military actions of the 
US and China will be discussed in the perspectives of the two theories. 
As put forward in section 3, the view on the importance of military power varies a great deal 
between offensive realism and complex interdependence. Offensive realism sees military 
capabilities as the most important factor for states in pursuing their overall aim: survival. In the 
view of offensive realism, this is always the case for states and will continue to be so (section 3). 
This differs somewhat from complex interdependence, as they acknowledge that survival is the 
premise for any state, but the focus on survival is becoming increasingly irrelevant, as the threats 
toward state survival are diminishing. Therefore, the arguments for the military aspects will also be 
different.  
 
The starting point for this discussion is based on the China’s military buildup and the increasing 
military focus on Taiwan and the region in general. Furthermore, this will be related to the theories. 
As put forward in section 3 and 5, offensive realism considers military power to be the most 
important aspect for obtaining hegemonic status. While the US currently holds this position, China 
can be said to be a threat, because of its increasing potential power (see section 5.1).  Therefore, 
there will be fear between both of them, since the fear, as shown, is based on uncertainty of the 
others’ intentions. The uncertainty, in the offensive realist perspective, is based on the increase in 
US sales of arms to Taiwan and China’s military modernization.  
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From a complex interdependence perspective, the effectiveness of military as an instrument is not 
that useful. It is therefore argued in chapter 5.2 that throughout the Sino-American relations to 
Taiwan, there have been plenty of disputes, but none have resulted in military confrontation. This 
shows that military conflict is a road neither the US, China or Taiwan for that matter want to go 
follow. 
But why do the US increase their military focus on “rebalancing Asia” and why do China put heavy 
investments into military modernization, if a military solution is no longer an effective policy, one 
might ask. These questions are to some degree difficult to answer for complex interdependence. 
You can argue that the military modernization of China doesn’t necessarily mean that China will 
use force to challenge the hegemonic status of the US. As mentioned in section 3.2, international 
cooperation is becoming increasingly important, and even the US has encouraged China to 
participate more in international coalitions (the Telegraph.com). The military buildup could 
therefore also be used by China to participate in international coalitions. They have increased their 
participation in peace keeping coalitions, and Chinese general Yao Yunzhu from Academy of 
Military Science claims they are committed to such actions. But he also says that they need to 
increase their military strength in order to do so. The criticism towards China, as a result of the 
investments in their military, is therefore unfair he says: “We are criticised if we do more and 
criticised if we do less. The West should decide what it wants. The international military order is 
US-led” (Economist.com b). Furthermore, it’s argued by several observers that China’s investment 
in their military only follows a natural path, as it simply reflects China’s economy. The Chinese 
investments in their military have been stable, around 2 % of GDP in the last centuries, which is 
well less than the US, who spend around 4 %. It has to be noted though that there is a great deal of 
uncertainty about how big a part of the GPD China actually spends on their military. Therefore, 
China’s military modernization is not a symbol of investments far beyond that of other states. The 
increasing investments in their military capabilities simply reflect the general economic 
development (Ibid; Oilprice.com). In the complex interdependence perspective, it can also be 
argued that the US and China have been cooperating on a long range of military issues, which 
indicates that conflict is unlikely. A recent example of this was that US held military drills with 
China at Hawaii in November 2013 (Businessweek.com).   
 
In the offensive realist perspective, China’s claim of increasing military capabilities, in order to 
engage in peace keeping coalitions, would not be a valid reason for military upgrading. Neither 
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would it result in less fear from a US perspective, as they can never be certain of China’s intentions. 
The same goes for China in relation to US sales of arms to Taiwan. As argued in section 5.1, 
uncertainty is driving the military buildup in the region. But if it’s a struggle for power, based on an 
endless uncertainty, why do the US and China cooperate on other military issues outside the region?  
This doesn’t make sense in an offensive realistic perspective. It’s further supported by Camilla 
Sørensen, when she says that we see this on a long range of issues: “… they also know that they 
have a lot of common interest, and a lot of reasons to cooperate. So this is what we see now…” 
(Sørensen: 28.59 - 31.17). As a counter argument though, one can say that if cooperation is the most 
important objective and the central factor in avoiding conflict between US and China, why does the 
US then negatively affect their relations with China by keep selling arms to Taiwan (see section 5)? 
As stated in section 5.2, this is hard to explain from a complex interdependence view. Contrary, this 
fits very well with the theory of offensive realism, as this indicates that the US try to contain 
China’s rise by keeping other countries in the region stronger. This is also supported by the US 
policy of pivot to Asia, and as Ivan Eland, defense analyst and author, claims:  
 
“In Asia the ring of U.S. – led alliances (formal and informal), a forward U.S. military presence, 
and closer American relations with great powers capable of acting to against a rising China 
constitute a de facto containment policy” (Eland 2003: 4). 
  
Offensive realism also has some explanatory force about China’s military modernization, as it can 
be seen as a logical move towards reunification with Taiwan and becoming a regional hegemon. 
According to Mearsheimer, unification often increases the persuasion of power, and as Taiwan’s 
geopolitical importance is big, this will further improve China’s power (see section 4 and 5). The 
“anti-secession law” from 2005 also shows that despite the fact that China prefers a peaceful 
unification, they will not shy from using military force, if this goes to show that peaceful unification 
is not possible (see section 4).  
China’s tensions with the US and other Asian countries, regarding the East and South China Sea, 
could indicate that China is showing signs of wanting to “dictate the region”, as Mearsheimer 
claimed they would seek to do (section 5.1). Such actions don’t directly go against the ideas of 
complex interdependence, though it’s acknowledged that there at times will be conflicts, as Hickey 
and Zhou states (section 5.2). In a complex interdependence view, it can be argued that as these 
conflicts have never resulted in military conflict, it indicates that disagreements are resolved 
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peacefully. But on the other hand, China’s actions could indeed indicate that they are changing their 
self-understanding of what role they can play in the region. Thus, there seems to be an indication 
that China is moving towards a more powerful role. We will argue, though, that this is yet very 
difficult to say, as China’s ambitions regarding their military intentions are not very transparent.  
This is supported by M. Taylor Fravel, professor of Political Science and a member of Security 
Studies program at MIT. Despite this, he has identified five goals from China’s military 
modernization through analysis of speeches, official documents and PLA papers from China. The 
goal of regional stability has already been presented in the section above and will therefore be 
omitted in this section. We’ll discuss three of the other goals, which are the most relevant for this 
project in order to get an indication about the ambitions regarding the military modernization from 
China. The three goals are:  National Unification, Maritime Security and Regional Stability. 
According to Fravel, the military buildup is important in regard to national unification, because 
according to the Chinese: “the Taiwan issue is the most real and prominent threat to our territorial 
security” (Fravel 2008: 128). Unification, through economic interdependence, is seen as the 
preferred strategy though. Military actions will only be used if the unification process seems to be 
heading in the wrong direction, as also stated in the “anti-secessions law” (Ibid; section 4).  
The goal of maritime security is also related to the military modernization, according to Fravel. He 
states, as also stated in section 4, that China is currently disagreeing with several countries 
regarding right to the seas bordering China. The maritime zones are highly important for trade and 
economic development in China. According to a Chinese study of military strategy: “… especially 
the threats facing strategic resource development and strategic passageways” (Fravel 2008: 129) in 
the seas are of massive importance. Thus, China needs a strong military in order to secure these 
zones, if they are unable to reach any agreements regarding them, as has been the case so far.  
Fravel states that the Chinese policy regarding regional stability is mostly concerned with the 
importance of trade for China’s economy and for “… resisting American posture against us” 
(Fravel 2008: 129). Thus the former argument can be said to be correspondent with complex 
interdependence, as it indicates that China’s policy is related to their dependence on trade and 
economic relations. In reverse, the latter argument about resisting American influence is based on 
an offensive realist idea about China wanting to seek to dominate the Asian region (Mearsheimer 
2010: 389; section 5). 
The goals put forward by Fravel seem to have a common focus on economy. This could indicate 
that the overall aim of the military can be said to be economic development. As put forward by 
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Fravel, China’s military capabilities are designed to create favorable conditions for economic 
growth. Therefore, the trade and economy seems to be the focus for Chinese military 
modernization, which can be said to be in line with complex interdependence, as economic 
relations, not war, is the most relevant policy. Despite the common aim for improving conditions 
for economic growth, the notion of keeping out US influence is in line with the view of offensive 
realism that China will seek to push out an overseas power from their own region. Furthermore, in 
this perspective, the official goals of China’s policies will still not influence US response, nor 
whether these are China’s real intentions. Because, as Mearsheimer claims, a state can never be 
certain of the other states’ intentions, no matter what is claimed by its counterpart (see section 3). 
Therefore, US sales of arms to Taiwan and their pivot to Asia are logical responses, as they will still 
seek to contain China.      
 
To sum up, it seems that complex interdependence has difficulties explaining China’s military 
modernization, but even more US policy and actions in the region. In regards to China’s military 
modernization, it’s argued that China’s military intentions are somewhat difficult to see through. 
Additionally, some state that their military investments are only a natural development of their 
economic growth, and China states to have peaceful intentions, such as participation in peace 
keeping coalitions and keeping regional stability. There is a lack of transparency in relation to a lot 
of issues though, and, as Mearsheimer argues, a state can never be certain of another state’s 
intentions. This seems to be even more the case with China, because of their lack of clear intentions. 
Furthermore, China’s actions in the East- and South China Sea show a country that has growing 
ambitions about dictating the events in the region. This is also evident in their relationship with the 
US, as they are increasingly taking actions as a response to US sales of arms to Taiwan. You can 
argue that this shows they feel that when their military strength increases, and their understanding 
of themselves as a big power increases, they are also lowering their willingness to adapt to US 
policies. Therefore, it seems difficult to assess which theory is the better at explaining the military 
development of China. One can say though that China’s official ambitions seem to indicate that 
economic interests are affecting their military intentions. But, simultaneously, their increasing 
military capabilities seem to increase their desire to affect events in the region. Overall, you can say 
that despite that fact, the the Sino-American relationship is centered around economy and to some 
degree military. But despite this, there seems to be uncertainty from both sides, which is affecting 
their behavior regarding military policies. This is reflected when Camilla Sørensen states that: “they 
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know they need to cooperate but they also fear what are the long term intentions of the other” 
(Sørensen: 28.59 – 31.17). This indicates that China’s military buildup is a result, as also 
Mearsheimer argues, of uncertainty regarding the intentions of the US.   
Similarly, this uncertainty seems to drive the US policies in the region. Therefore, complex 
interdependence is to a large degree unable to explain their actions. One can argue that the 
increasing Sino-American military relations indicate increasing cooperation, but it seems there are 
still more that indicate that the US policies, presented in this section, are more correspondent with 
offensive realism. It’s argued that the US sales of arms and the pivot to Asia seem to be in line with 
Mearsheimer’s idea about regional hegemony. These policies look like a de facto containment 
policy, as Eland states, and it indicates that the US is trying to outbalance China in the region. It 
seems evident that US prioritize outbalancing China higher than their economic relations in the 
Sino-American relationship. This is especially evident in the issue of Taiwan, where the 
continuance of arms sales and support helps maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence, but hurts 
the Sino-American relationship at the same time.     
 
6.2 Economy 
As we saw earlier, the two theories have different views on the role of a state’s economy, but they 
both, of course, regard economy as a very important factor. The theory of complex interdependence 
sees wealth, and thereby the economy, as one of the most important goals for the state to achieve. 
But where complex interdependence sees economy as the end, offensive realism, on the other and, 
seems to regard economy more as means to an end. In this point of view, a strong economy is 
necessary to achieve the primary goal: survival and strength through military power.  
But is survival such a relevant issue today? Is the international system all about conflict and 
competition? According to offensive realism, the US and China compete for becoming hegemons of 
their respective regions. America, being the stronger of the two, is simultaneously trying to prevent 
China from gaining regional hegemony, thus securing the US’ position as the world’s only super 
power. But if that is the case, why do we see a Sino-American relationship where there is a high 
degree of cooperation and mutual benefits? In 1945, America was the world’s biggest creditor 
(Joseph 2002: 196), but as we stated earlier, the US, in 2009, was the leading debtor nation in the 
world, borrowing money from China, who was the largest creditor nation that year (Cohen 2009: 
289). In the year 2012, of all the US trading partners, China was the country earning the most from 
the US in 2012 (Figure 2 see appendix). A subscriber to the theory of complex interdependence 
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would argue that these numbers show how dependent the two states are on each other. This is also a 
good argument for the unlikeliness of military conflict, as it would hurt both countries’ economy. It 
looks like both states are much more interested in increasing their wealth and avoiding unnecessary 
tension, than engaging in costly military conflicts. Not only that, their economies are now so 
intertwined that military conflicts seem almost unthinkable, as it would be ill-advised to attack 
one’s own trading partner. A US attack on China would be an attack on their own economy, since 
the world’s biggest economy and the world’s fastest growing economy will gain so much more by 
stimulating each other’s economy. As their economies get more and more intertwined, the 
international system looks more and more like it is based on complex interdependence, since the 
world seems to get smaller and countries are cooperating on an international scale. The realist, on 
the other hand, would probably argue that the only reason the US is cooperating so much with 
China is because they currently are dependent on China’s economy. If America’s economy became 
strong again, while becoming less and less dependent on China, maybe we would see US presidents 
shifting their focus from trading to violations of human rights, as seen during the Clinton 
administration in the early 1990’s (Cohen 2009: 253). 
As we have argued before, we have seen multiple examples of disputes being handled by 
diplomacy. Liberals would argue that all of the incidents, including China supplying weapon 
technology to the US’s enemies and the Tiananmen Square controversy, indicate the validity of 
complex interdependence. Both countries are more interested in cooperating and strengthening their 
economies. But the realist, on the other hand, would point to the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996, 
where the instrument of military force was used to settle the dispute. Even though the conflict didn’t 
evolve into a full scale war, military power proved to be the most successful tool, and it 
demonstrated Chinas aggressive behavior. It was also an event that showed America’s 
determination to support Taiwan, despite of economic relations. 
But how important is Taiwan to the US? As we saw in the analysis, Taiwan is one of the biggest 
traders in the world, and it is of huge importance to the Americans economically. As we saw earlier, 
Taiwan was the US’ 7th biggest trading partner in 1997 (Tucker 1998-99: 153), which 
demonstrates, according to complex interdependence, why the role of Taiwan is so important to 
America. The liberal notion of democracies as peaceful and easy partners fits also nicely with the 
theory. Realists, however, would argue that Taiwan’s importance is due to strategic and geopolitical 
reasons. Control of the Taiwan Strait is important in relation to trade and shipping in the South 
China Sea, which makes a potential unification with Taiwan and China more powerful in relation to 
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trade. As stated earlier, John F. Copper also argues that Taiwan’s importance to US is closely 
related to the ambition to restrict the Chinese developing a stronger navy (Nationalinterest.org). 
This fact fits perfectly with the notion of restricting other potential hegemons’ power and influence 
in offensive realism.  
Discussing the two theories, it seems that both can explain some aspects of the Sino-American 
relationship, and that they have difficulties explaining others. As we argued earlier, if the US really 
wanted to improve their relationship with China, maximizing trade opportunities and decreasing the 
chances of an armed conflict, they should cut their ties to Taiwan, according to complex 
interdependence. Why spend so much energy on Taiwan Strait relations, if we focus on the 
economic perspective, when it damages Sino-America relations? As Paul V. Kane argues in the 
New York Times that option would decrease American debt, improve the Sino-American 
relationship and the US would avoid a very expensive war against China (NYTimes.com). 
Offensive realism, on the other hand, prefers military and strategic superiority. A realist would 
never sacrifice Taiwan’s de facto independence for financial opportunities, since a conflict 
involving two great powers of the world is inevitable. A strong actor like the US must always be 
prepared for potential conflicts. According to Michael Mazza, in an article refuting Kane, America 
has a lot of strategic reasons not to cancel Taiwanese relations. As the island has geopolitical 
importance for both countries, the US would lose a strategic advantage, while China would gain 
advantage (American.com). However, when it comes to the economic aspect of their relationship, 
complex interdependence is much better at explaining the actions of all actors in the region. Nye 
warns us not to look at the relationship between the US, China and Taiwan in a strict realist context 
or a strict liberal context, as none of the theories are perfect, which also reflects our attitude. They 
are not prophetic and an armed conflict is not inevitable. Most importantly, Nye argues, they will 
both benefit much more from cooperating than engaging in a avoidable conflict, which is what the 
theory of complex interdependence is all about: 
 
“It makes no more sense to see the world through a purely realist lens — that focuses only on the 
top chessboard and predicts conflict with China — than it does to see through a liberal lens that 
looks primarily at a single board and predicts only cooperation. In a tri-level game, a player who 
focuses on only one board is bound to lose in the long run. Fortunately, China and the United States 
have more to gain from the cooperation dimension of their relationship than from the conflict one. 
Both just need to recognize that.” (latimes.com)  
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To sum up, it is impossible to predict the future, but there seem to be many factors that indicate that 
the US, China and Taiwan will keep their cooperating relationships, or maybe even develop them 
even further. As the world gets smaller, global conflicts and crises, such as global warming and 
international terrorism, have to be dealt with on an international level. According to Joseph Nye, the 
co-creator of the theory of complex interdependence, many of the future problems of the world need 
to be solved by all the big nations cooperating: 
 
“China and the United States — as well as Europe, Japan and other nations — will be facing new 
transnational challenges on issues such as climate change, terrorism, cyber security and pandemics. 
These issues, which will only become more urgent, will require cooperation, including help in many 
cases from nongovernmental agencies.” (LAtimes.com) 
 
However, Mearsheimer would analyze the situation in the Asian region using the concept of relative 
gains. As we saw in section 3, great powers, such as the US and China, care about the balance of 
power. They tend to emphasize on relative gains rather than absolute gains when considering 
cooperation, which has a tendency to complicate relations a lot. As mentioned, the actors want to 
achieve power at the collaborator’s expense. The most obvious example would be to look at the 
relationship between China and Taiwan, and the signing of the EFCA agreement, which brings 
Taiwan closer to mainland China. The agreement benefits Taiwan financially, but there is also a 
chance China will gain economic leverage over the island. That means, hypothetically, Beijing 
could be able to use economic tools to control the Taiwanese government, and maybe succeed in 
trying to unify the island with mainland China again. However, the US, using the concept of 
relative gains, will be interested to contain China’s potential powers, and will probably seek to 
prevent such unification. 
 
6.3 Interest 
In this section we will discuss how, and to what extent, the events put forward previously in the 
project can be explained by our theoretical approaches. This section will therefore work as a sort of 
sub-conclusion for the previous sections, in the way we try to define how the actions of the US and 
China can be understood in relation to the two theories. 
As pointed out in the chapter 3 and 5, there are big differences in the perspective of offensive 
realism and complex interdependence regarding their view of the main interest for states. For 
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offensive realism, the main focus is on survival, which is achieved mainly through military power. 
For complex interdependence it is economic relations that are primarily the end goal, and thereby 
also increasing welfare domestically. This shapes how the different theories view the interests of the 
US and China.  
 
The official policies of both US and China are based on regional stability and peaceful intentions. 
As shown by Fravel (see 6.1), the official Chinese policies seeks to “rise peacefully” (Wu 2006: 2) 
and seek a peaceful unification with Taiwan, thereby clearly stating intentions of following a 
peaceful path. Likewise, US also states intentions of peace and stability in the region. This was 
made clear by then US secretary of defense William Cohen in 2012 when he stated that:  
 
“We don't want to confront any country. We want to have close relations with emerging countries in 
Asia such as the ASEAN member states India and Japan while at the same time supporting stability 
in the region” (Cohen 2012). 
 
From these statements there seems to be a consensus between the US and China. They both want to 
go down a peaceful and cooperative path. This fits well with the theory of complex interdependence 
as it claims that the economic interdependence between states will result in peaceful solutions to 
issues. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, states that cooperation is not very likely, and thus the 
official policies of US and China seem contrary to offensive realism. According to offensive 
realism, the official policies are not to be believed anyway, as a state can never be certain of the 
others’ intentions. He elaborates this by saying that:  
 
“The root of the problem is that unlike military capabilities, which we can see and count, intentions 
cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the mind of decision makers and they are especially 
difficult to discern. One might think that Chinese leaders can use words to explain their intentions. 
But talk is cheap and leaders have been known to lie to foreign audiences” (Mearsheimer 2010: 
383) 
 
In this perspective, the official policies of China and the US can’t be seen as their real intentions. As 
stated in the previous sections in this chapter, there seems to be indications that this is partially 
shown by their actions in the Asian region. But simultaneously, many signs are pointing in the 
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direction of cooperation, especially regarding economics. According to a perspective of offensive 
realism, as argued in section 6.1, the military modernization of China and the increasing military 
focus of the US in the Asian region, are to some degree a sign of the ambitions of, respectively, 
increasing and maintaining influence in the region. The military focus does not fit well with the 
complex interdependence theory, as it is argued that military options are no longer very effective. 
To a certain degree, the Chinese military modernization can be said to be aiming at peaceful 
intentions, although it’s very unclear as there is a lack of transparency in regards to the Chinese 
military. As China’s military capabilities and the uncertainty of their intentions increases, the US 
fear of China will, in an offensive realist perspective, rise. Therefore, it’s likely that the US fear of 
China is based on a fear of their intentions, as stated by Wu: “It is reasonable that a rising power 
often likes to woo status quo powers while it actually prepares to challenge them”   (Wu 2006: 3). 
 
On the other hand, there is also strong evidence supporting the theory of complex interdependence 
in relation to the Sino-American relationship, as there is a high level of interdependence between 
the economies of US and China. As shown in section 6.2, the US is highly dependent on China as a 
debtor and China is dependent on the US consumers for their export. The latter is also supported by 
a general acknowledgement among scholars that China is very dependent on foreign investments 
and that: “… China’s degree of trade dependence is the highest among the world’s major 
countries” (Ibid: 4). This is a clear argument for the theory of complex interdependence: the US 
and China are highly interdependent and thus unlikely to engage in a military conflict with each 
other. It seems to be evident that in relation to their economic interests and policies, the theory of 
complex interdependence is more suitable for explaining the Sino – American relationship. This 
supports the idea presented by Fravel (see 6.1) that the Chinese military modernization is mostly 
related to protecting national interest and securing their trade. 
 
But how come, there seems to be evidence supporting both theories, when they have such a 
differentiated view of what US and China’s national interest is? We will argue that this is related to 
the high complexity of the Sino-American relationship. As Camilla Sørensen puts it:  
 
“… they (US) are seeing China as a rival, but they’re also acknowledging that they need China. So 
it’s kind of this ambivalent relationship on both sides actually. The Chinese feel the same, they’ve 
also seen the US as a threat and the US trying to contain China on the one hand and on the other 
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hand they acknowledge that they need the US in order to simply realize a lot of goals and ambitions 
that they have” (Sørensen: 04.29 – 05.24) 
 
As a result, there seems to be a strategic relationship where they cooperate on issues of common 
interest, e.g. trade. But on the other side, there is also a range of issues upon which they disagree. 
The need for cooperation shapes their relationship, as they have national interests, which are of 
higher importance than the struggle for power seems to be right now.  In relation to China, this is 
pointed out by Harry Harding in an article in the foreign policy journal, where he states that: 
“China's most severe risks are ecological - particularly its environmental problems and its 
vulnerability to communicable disease” (Harding 2007: 1). Similarly, to the US, the domestic 
issues are of more importance, as they struggle to overcome the effects of the financial crisis 
(Hunkovic 2009: 3). This focus on domestic welfare issues supports the complex interdependence 
theory, and indicates that it’s more effective in explaining the official policies of cooperation and 
stability in the region. We therefore argue, that there is evidence supporting the idea that there is a 
high level of interdependence between US and China, and that both states are aware of this. As a 
result, they seek to keep stability in the region in order to promote their national, mostly economic, 
interests.  
 
The increasing military focus from the US and China is not irrelevant though. As argued in chapter 
5.1.2 and 6.1, there is a great deal of uncertainty of intentions between the two countries. The 
military modernization, the US pivot to Asia and increasing arm sales to Taiwan are consequences 
of this uncertainty. Some of the military events occurring in the Asian region can thus be explained 
by the theory of offensive realism. But since it seems there is a high level of interdependence, the 
military buildup might not only be related to ambitions of becoming a regional hegemon. It seems 
more likely that there is a wish to cooperate, but at the same time the uncertainty about the 
counterpart’s intentions leads the US and China to increase the military focus as a secondary plan. 
This is done to minimize the risk of being caught off guard if either state has intentions of 
increasing their power in the region. Despite this, the US sales of arms to Taiwan contradict with 
the idea of interdependence as it hurts Sino – American relations. This indicates that there is a level 
containment policy from the US, simultaneously with their cooperating policies towards China.    
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6.4 View on change 
As argued in the previous section, there seems to be evidence supporting the complex 
interdependence theory regarding the policies of the US and China. Despite this, there is still a great 
deal of uncertainty of intentions between the two states, which has resulted in a growing military 
focus in the Asian region. This is more easily explained by the offensive realist assumption. These 
results are important when trying to explore China’s challenge to US hegemony.  
First, it will be important to clarify what hegemony implies. As stated in section 1.4, a hegemon is a 
state that has a clear acknowledged leadership, that creates norms tied to economic and military 
capabilities, and sets up institutions.  Therefore, our discussion, regarding China’s challenge to US 
hegemony, will be based on this understanding of a hegemon. Furthermore, the perception of a 
change in power balance from the two theoretical approaches will also be used in the discussion of 
China’s challenge to US hegemony. 
Starting off with the idea of a hegemon being clearly acknowledged by leaders by all other states, 
the results from the previous chapters seem to indicate that China’s challenge to US hegemony is 
relatively modest. China has stated that the world is “US-led” (Newsgroup.com; see 6.1) and thus 
acknowledges that the US still is seen as the world leader. This is supported by the US that also 
recognizes this role. This is underlined by Ben Rhodes, deputy National Security advisor, when he 
clarified an earlier Obama statement: “He was saying we are the global superpower. Like it or not 
that means that we are going to have to play a role,” (The daily caller.com). Furthermore, as the 
pivot to Asia has shown, the US has made stronger military alliances with a lot of Asian countries. 
This could further indicate that these countries acknowledge the US role as a world leader when 
trying to protect themselves from a potential aggressive China. This indicates that the US is still 
regarded as the hegemon among other states. 
 
The other part of the hegemonic definition is related to how hegemons create norms through 
economic and military capabilities. In this regard there can be said to be more substance to China’s 
challenge to US hegemony. As presented in the previous sections, the economies of US and China 
are highly interdependent. The complex interdependence theory argues that there is no clear 
hierarchy of issues and thus that the power can change from issue to issue. This can be said to be 
the case for China in economic issues. As China is now the biggest creditor and the US the biggest 
debtor one could conclude that there is a change in the power balance between the two in this 
regard. The high number of trade relations also improves their influence on economic issues. As 
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argued in the previous section, their relationship is of an interdependence character. This comprises 
that China might have gained more influence in economic issues in relation to US. It should be 
noted though, that China is still very dependent on the US consumers as well, which means that the 
United States still have a lot to say on economic issues.  
The growing influence of China in economic relations is especially relevant when considering the 
Sino-Taiwan relations where Taiwan is becoming increasingly dependent on China (see 4.1.2 and 
5.1.2). It is specifically argued that the ECFA is increasing Taiwan’s dependency on China and 
therefore increasing China’s influence. This is a clear indication of how China is improving its 
influence through economic matters. China’s challenge to US hegemony should therefore be 
considered in an economic perspective. 
 In regards to challenging norms, one can argue that the fact that Clinton lowered the priority of 
human rights in order to promote economic relations with China, is an example of importance of 
economic issues (see 4.1.1). This case showed that China can influence the norms through the 
importance of their economy and thereby downplay the importance of e.g. human rights. 
 
When considering their influence from a military perspective, one can say that China’s power is not 
as big as in economic affairs. China’s military capabilities are still a long way behind the American. 
This was pointed out by Chinese general Gen Liang, when he stated that: “There's a generational 
gap" between the military capabilities of the US and China (breakingnews.ie). This is also 
supported by American experts (Want China Times.com). As argued in section 6.3 the increasing 
military power of China has entailed a rise of their confidence in relation to military issues in the 
Asian region. This shows growing signs of ambitions of wanting to become a hegemon but 
simultaneously China states that they have no intentions of creating conflict (See 6.3). This is 
supported by Camilla Sørensen that says that China does have ambitions but is still focusing on 
domestic issues and benefitting from the US’ position as hegemon: 
  
“They(China) have a lot of ambitions about wanting to become a big power and wanting to get 
international respect but they also acknowledge that the gain a lot from the US being the hegemon 
actually. Because the US (…) ensure regional stability in a lot of regions and play an important role 
in the Middle East and all these things are things that are really important for Chinas continuing 
economic development” (Sørensen: 24.17 – 28.59) 
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This indicates that China might have ambitions of rising as shown in section 6.3 but not necessarily 
to challenge the hegemonic status of the US. Mearsheimer’s perception of change seems to be 
further suggesting that China will not challenge US hegemony. In his view, big changes in the 
power balance mostly happen as a result of great power war. As argued in the previous section (see 
6.3) a war between US and China doesn’t seem likely as their high level of interdependence makes 
a war very costly. But international order can also be maintained peacefully, according to offensive 
realism, when it matches both states’ interests. The US and China will avoid a war if they are likely 
to lose it, which at this point would be lost by the Chinese. Thus, if the theory of offensive realism 
is correct, it is not likely that Beijing will instigate a war as long as they don’t have the military 
capabilities to match the US.  
It must be stated though, that as China’s potential power is big, with a huge population and big 
economic growth, it’s likely, if following this theoretical perspective, that China will challenge the 
US once their military power is strong enough.  
 
If staying in the perspective of offensive realism, the US, being the hegemon in its own region, will 
tend to contain China, as they can possibly threaten America’s share of world power. There seems 
to be indications that the US does to some degree try to contain China, and thereby obstruct China’s 
challenge to US hegemony.  
Finally, if relating to the last part of our definition of hegemony about setting up institutions, US 
can be said to have created the current global institutions (Wall street Journal.com). Furthermore, as 
shown in previous sections China officially claims it has no ambitions of becoming a hegemon. 
This is supported by Camilla Sørensen that claims that: “there is no interest in China to challenge 
the US hegemony” (Sørensen 24.17 – 28.59) and backs this up by saying that this is visible in their 
lack of ideas about how to contribute to the international system:  
 
“… there is no clear vision in China because you would say that if they wanted to become a 
hegemon and a great power and being equal with the US and all these things. They also have to 
have thought through what they can contribute with and what are their visions about how the 
international system should be different from what the US thinks. And all those things there are too 
much where they are preoccupied with dealing with domestic challenges” (Ibid) 
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To sum up, there seems to be very few indications of China challenging the hegemonic status of the 
US. First, there is both by China, US and other states in the region a clear acknowledgement of US 
being the hegemon. Second, their military capabilities are still way behind those of the US and a 
military conflict between the two states seems unlikely, especially due to the big level of 
interdependence and the focus on domestic issues. There is a level of uncertainty regarding China’s 
military intentions though, and their military build-up does, in an offensive realist perspective, 
indicate ambitions of becoming a regional hegemon. One can claim however, that these ambitions 
are difficult to clarify and their focus seems to remain on domestic issues anyway. Thirdly, China 
has no idea about how to impact the international institutions. This is closely related to the lack of 
ambitions about affecting those institutions as there is no desire to become a regional hegemon. 
  
It is solely in an economic aspect that China can be said to be challenging the hegemonic status of 
the US. In economic issues the interdependence between the US and China is affecting their internal 
relationship, and increasing China’s influence since there is no clear power balance between the two 
states in this respect. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
From the time of The Great Aberration, the Sino-American relationship has been very volatile, 
experiencing many ups and down. Furthermore, the relationship has changed a lot since 1979.  
During the 80’s, China was very dependent of US trade and investments. As the Cold War ended, 
several disputes arose between the countries, as their focus shifted from being on their common 
enemy, the USSR, to being on other interests, such as the growing Chinese economy which became 
the third largest in the world at the turn of the millennium. In the year 2000, the U.S. exports to 
China were worth 16.3 billion $, while their imports reached 100.1 billion $. This indicates an 
interdependence between the two states, as China’s economic development is dependent on US 
consumers, while the US companies are dependent on cheap Chinese labor and goods. Despite the 
increasing economic relations, there has still been a great deal of disagreement over political and 
military issues. 
The Taiwanese issue has since the establishment of the island in 1949 been a sensitive issue 
regarding the Sino-American relationship. The US has since the Great Aberration acknowledged a 
“one China policy” seeing Beijing as the legitimate government. Despite this, they have still 
supported Taiwan with arms in order for them to protect themselves, which resulted in a great deal 
of tensions in the Sino – American relationship, as China regards Taiwan to be “the one that got 
away” and still sees them as a part of China. In 1996, the Taiwan Strait crisis occurred, which is the 
closest the United States and China have been to war since the Vietnam War. The Taiwan issue is 
still of great importance today, as the US has increased their arm sales to Taiwan, provoking the 
Chinese and creating increased tension between the two despite the overall increase in cooperation 
on a long range of issues.  
 
In an offensive realism perspective, it can be concluded that the actions of the US and China 
indicate an increasing focus on power in the Asian region. Due to their huge potential power, China 
is to a certain extent feared by the US, who therefore will try to contain China’s rise in the region. 
In the perspective of complex interdependence, there is a great wish for cooperation between the US 
and China as they both benefit from this scenario. Consequently, they seem to focus more on 
improving domestic welfare than struggling for power in the region, as offensive realism states.  
 
It can further be concluded that there is evidence supporting the theory of complex interdependence 
as the high level of cooperation between the US and China seems to make a military conflict very is 
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implausible. This improbability is further emphasized by the high cost of war and the negative 
effects a war will have on their respective domestic welfare issues. At this point, such issues appear 
to be of greater importance to US and China, which also correspondents with the theory of complex 
interdependence. Even though concluding this, one should still be aware of the increased military 
focus in Asia between US and China, as uncertainty about each other’s intentions and suspicion 
leads them to an increase of military capabilities in the region. Both states seek to secure themselves 
of one of them choosing to follow a path of power behavior, instead of increasing cooperation. 
Especially, the US policy indicates some degree of containment policy, as the sales of arms to 
Taiwan is contradictive to the pursuit of increasing cooperation in the Sino – American relations.       
 
This project concludes that the hypothesis of China challenging the hegemonic status of the US 
seems to be incorrect in many ways. It can be concluded that the US is still seen as the world’s clear 
hegemon by China, the US as well as other states in the Asian region. Furthermore, the military 
capabilities of China are still lacking far behind their American counterpart’s. Thereby China 
doesn’t seem to challenge US hegemony at this moment in time. On the other hand, military 
capabilities don’t seem to be the most important currently, as the high level of interdependence 
between the US and China appears to be dominating the current agenda.  
The hegemonic status of the US has been increasingly challenged on economic issues, although the 
growing interdependence between the United States and China has resulted in a more equal power 
balance between the two states in economic regards. China can thereby employ many measures to 
pressure the US, as its influence on the international system continuously increases. 
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8.0 Afterthoughts 
This chapter is a reflection on other areas, issues and angles that could have been implemented in 
the thesis, and what such choices would have entailed. Numerous different paths could have been 
followed, for instance focusing on the growing tension in the Korean peninsula, territorial issues 
between Japan and China, and the possibility of challenges toward either US or China from other 
rising powers. 
An issue that concerns both China and the United States is North Korea. North Korea borders to 
both China and South Korea, an American ally, but is also close to other allies, such as Japan, and 
to some extent Taiwan. The geographical positioning of the countries creates fertile soil for many 
tensions, because of the hostile and aggressive nature and rhetoric towards the US and its ally. 
China and North Korea have ties going back many years and still have. Those relations are mainly 
economical, but because of North Koreas aggressive nature, they have also become a burden for 
China. This aggressive tone mixed, with a potential for developing nuclear weapons, creates an 
uncertainty for the US and especially South Korea. A possible aggressive reaction from North 
Korea against an American ally would compel them to react. Such a reaction would force US 
military close to Chinese borders, and create possibility for miscalculations that could escalate into 
war.  
China and the United States have, on the one hand, interest in North Korea and South Korea, but on 
the other hand, also in each other. An investigation of the two countries’ reactions, based on their 
interests and allies, could have been another way of assessing, whether China and the US are 
heading towards cooperation or confrontation.   
Another US ally that could play a major role in the Sino-American relationship, is Japan. Several 
American military facilities are stationed in Japan and an agreement of military support, in the case 
of an attack on Japan, has been signed between the two countries. 
China and Japan have a very conflictual history, full of disputes, war and tension. Those tensions 
can still be outlined today, for example in the case of China and Japan´s severe territorial disputes 
over the uninhabited islands called the Senkaku Islands. As with North Korea, the dispute has the 
potential to evolve. One could examine the Sino-Japanese relationship regarding these islands, but 
also the evolution of this case would affect the liaison between China and the US. A potential 
conflict would probably have a very negative effect on the Sino-American relationship, as the latter 
will be obliged to take a stand, as they have signed a treaty securing Japan military support, even 
though they have interests in China. A further research could establish the reasons why these small 
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uninhabited islands are of such a great importance for the two countries. Is it nationalism, for 
strategic reasons or a third reason?  
Another way of approaching the thesis would have been to make a comparative analysis between 
China and the United States. This would have meant a very thorough survey of the issue, by, for 
instance, comparing economic data. Although this might not have been very exciting, it would have 
made us able to draw a proven conclusion, based on logical arguments and empirical evidence. 
The “bi-polar” focus in this project could have been challenged, by having a more international 
vision. As a point of departure, it would be very difficult to argue for the fact that only China and 
the United States are playing leading roles in the future world order. From now on, the power 
balance should probably be seen as an interaction between several actors, instead of the hegemonic 
focus of this paper. The focus could thus be changed into including other rapid growing economies, 
such as Brazil, India or Russia (BRIC-countries), trying to assess whether (and if yes, how) these 
countries will challenge China and the United States, and how the existing main powers will react 
to that.   
Countries as Brazil and India, with their high level of economic growth, have the potential to 
challenge the US on an economic basis. On military issues, they are lacking far behind, but because 
of their alliance with the United States, the military aspect is not of the same importance as when 
talking of China.  
When it comes to China, it would be interesting to see how Brazil or India could be a challenge, 
both economically and militarily. In the past, India has had border issues with China, creating some 
still unsolved tensions that might evolve if an economic competition and arms race escalates. 
Finally, China’s role and influence in the international system could have been evaluated using 
other criteria, such as values. This would have implied an investigation on the ability of ‘Eastern’ 
values to be the dominant ones, and scrutinize their impact outside the Asian region, the UN for 
example. In relation to this paper, the spread of these values could have been studied in the light of 
their enlarged military, political and economic influence.  
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